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FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
By all accounts, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002' (Sarbanes-Oxley)
represented a significant intrusion by the federal government into the
substantive regulation of corporate governance of U.S. public companies,
an area long considered to be the province of state corporate law. Among
other things, Sarbanes-Oxley and the accompanying rules of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and self-regulatory organizations
(SROs) like the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) instructed boards of
directors how to monitor senior executives of their companies and imposed
new duties and restrictions upon those executives. This kind of
substantive, even paternalistic, regulation of a public firm's corporate
governance brings to mind the federal banking agencies' regulation of
national and state banks and bank and financial holding companies. Bank
regulators screen proposed executives and directors of a new bank and
may not allow the bank to begin operations if they disapprove of some or
all of these individuals. They set standards of conduct for bank officers
and directors and continue, through regular examinations, to monitor them
and their performances. Moreover, bank regulators have considerable
informal and formal enforcement powers; they can even remove
executives and directors, temporarily or permanently, from a financial
institution or from the entire banking industry. Indeed, in Sarbanes-Oxley
Congress borrowed part of its regulation of public company management
from banking law.2
In this Article, I contend that Sarbanes-Oxley represents a significant
step in the ongoing development of a paternalistic federal regulation of
public firm management that is in certain respects comparable to the
regulation of bank and bank holding company management by federal
banking agencies. However, I argue that the regulation of public firm
management, as it has occurred, is too oriented towards the punishment of
directors and officers. Federal regulation of bank management is all-
encompassing, covering bank officers and directors from the time a bank
begins its operations onward. The pervasive regulatory guidance and
constant interaction, both informal and formal, between bank managers
and regulators give the managers notice of the regulators' expectations for
their behavior and an early warning of regulators' concerns and problems
with it. The prescreening and ongoing monitoring thus justify the serious
penalties that can be assessed against a bank officer or director by a bank
regulator, whether through administrative proceedings or the courts, or by
1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley].
2. See infra notes 65, 165-66 and accompanying text.
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a U.S. attorney in a criminal prosecution.
By contrast, neither the SEC nor any SRO screens officers or directors
of public companies. At the direction of Congress, the SEC and the SROs
increasingly specify standards of conduct for these officers and directors.
However, they do not monitor officers' and directors' compliance with the
standards, inspect the firms or interact with them formally (or even
informally) outside of enforcement and prosecutions. Despite this
approach, which reflects the SEC's jurisdictional limitation to the
regulation of company disclosure, the SEC's disciplinary powers over
public firm management have grown, as has criminal liability for officers
and directors. Those powers more and more parallel the powers of bank
regulators over (and the criminal liability of) bank officers and directors.
Officers and directors of public firms can be punished harshly even though
they do not have the kind of ongoing, close relationship with the SEC and
the SROs that their bank counterparts have with bank regulators.
This state of affairs leads to a quandary. As a theoretical and practical
matter, the SEC and the SROs cannot replicate the prescreening, setting of
standards and oversight of management provided by bank regulators.
Public companies are in diverse industries and, in many cases, are
exceedingly complex organizations. Thus, it would be difficult to find
regulators and examiners who could competently prescreen public
company officers and directors, set appropriate behavior standards for
them, and then evaluate their performances. Indeed, bank regulators
acknowledge the difficulty of standard-setting and monitoring for the
management of the largest banking organizations; as a result, they are
relying more on organizations' self-regulation and even advocating the use
of a disclosed, market-based monitoring of these organizations, especially
as they become financial and even commercial conglomerates.3 Moreover,
the all-encompassing bank regulation has itself not always deterred bank
management scandals, and arguments can be made that the costs of this
regulation do not justify its benefits.4
Yet current corporate governance in public companies-i.e., the
supervision and monitoring of executives by boards of directors'-is
unsatisfactory. Despite improvements to the boards' abilities to govern
over the last decades, including those derived from Sarbanes-Oxley, and
despite the activism of institutional shareholders,6 directors often do a poor
job of monitoring executives. Current corporate governance has been
3. See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
4. For a summary of these arguments, see JONATHAN R. MACEY ET AL., BANKING LAW AND
REGULATION 639-44 (3d ed. 2001).
5. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 192-93 (2002).
6. See generally MICHAEL USEEM, INVESTOR CAPITALISM: How MONEY MANAGERS ARE
CHANGING THE FACE OF CORPORATE AMERICA (1996).
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particularly ineffective in countering the excessively self-interested
behavior of executives, as shown by the corporate scandals of the early
2000s.' Boards of public firms often failed in their monitoring, although
not because the directors' motivations to perform well were inadequate or
because there were technical, but easily resolvable, problems in
governance arrangements. Rather, the failure often was due to the
formation in public firms of a destructively cohesive group of senior
executives, corporate advisors such as bankers, accountants and lawyers,
and even some board members, led by the CEO. Influenced by a group
mentality, an "inner circle" operated a firm for its own benefit. Social
psychologists explain why these groups form and identify their typical
failings, in particular their resistance and hostility to anything and anyone
contradicting their views and behavior.8
Social psychologists suggest that one way to prevent the formation of
these perverse groups, or to break apart existing ones, is to involve in the
monitoring of the groups an outsider who is loyal to an organization other
than the groups and who, as a result, can resist the attraction of the groups'
circles.9 For public companies, this person would have to be someone not
from the public company, nor from a professional firm providing services
to it. One logical outsider is an employee or a representative of a
government regulator like the SEC that is already involved in the
regulation of public companies. This leads back to the issue of the
substantive oversight of public company management, with the problem
that the SEC is ill-suited to offer a complete paternalistic regulation.
The bank regulatory model could offer a solution to the problem of
public company management regulation, even if the entirety of this model
is not practical or desirable. One possibility is that the SEC could appoint
a corporate governance monitor for certain public firms who would have
a role like that of an examiner of a large bank or financial holding
7. I refer here to the self-interested behavior of people like (to name just a few) Enron's
CFO Andrew Fastow, see WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR. ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 209-37 (2002);
WorldCom's CEO Bernie Ebbers, see RICHARD C. BREEDON, RESTORING TRUST: REPORT TO THE
HON. JED S. RAKOFF, THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW
YORK ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE FUTURE OF MCI 767-68, 787-91 (2003); and Tyco
International's CEO Dennis Kozlowski, see Mark Maremount & Laurie P. Cohen, Executive
Privilege: How Tyco 's CEO Enriched Himself-Mr. Kozlowski, Ex-Chief Got Secret Loans, Spent
Firm's Cash as His Own-A $6,000 Shower Curtain, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2002, at Al.
8. See infra Part IV.B. See generally James Fanto, Whistleblowing andthe Public Director:
Countering Corporate Inner Circles, 83 OR. L. REV. 435,460-72 (2004).
9. See infra note 217 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Roger J. Volkema & Ronald
H. Gorman, The Influence of Cognitive-Based Group Composition on Decision-Making Process
and Outcome, 35 J. MGMT. STUD. 105, 117-18 (1998).
[Vol. 58
PATERNALISTIC REGULATIONS OF PUBLIC COMPANY MANAGEMENT
company.' ° The SEC would hire, train, and oversee the performance of
these monitors, who would be supervised by that part of the SEC's
Division of Corporation Finance responsible for their firms and industry.
Among other things, a monitor would promote the development of
professional standards in a board, assist the board in reviewing any
conflicts of interest, look for "red flags" of serious management problems,
and convey to directors and executives, on an ongoing and informal basis,
any SEC concerns about their conduct. Interaction with the monitor would
give executives and directors an opportunity to address any problems in
their behavior before the SEC instituted formal enforcement proceedings
or the Department of Justice began criminal action. The presence of the
monitors "on the ground" in public companies would also enable the SEC
to receive valuable information about companies and industries, which
could improve overall company disclosure as the SEC becomes aware of,
and demands corrections to, inadequacies in current disclosure.
This significant extension of SEC paternalistic regulation of public
company management would be controversial and could be seen as a
throwback to governance procedures in state-owned firms. " The backlash
against Sarbanes-Oxley is in full swing, and it is unrealistic to believe that
any reform intrusive upon public company management would succeed in
the present political climate.12 All aspects of the proposal should be
debated and variations on it are imaginable, such as requiring only certain
public firms to have monitors or allowing most firms to opt out of a
monitor requirement. Even if the immediate success of the proposal is
unlikely, it is important that proposals on public company governance be
put forward, and kept alive if they are deserving, particularly since it can
be argued that recent governance reforms, rather than going too far, did not
go far enough in controlling public company management. The reform will
have the added advantage of bringing into the open the paternalistic
10. See infra Part V.C.
11. For example, in French private companies that were state-owned, the French state had
the right to place representatives on the board, to have its agents inspect the company, and to place
its agents as monitors within the company. See generally JEAN KERNINON, LES CADRES JURIDIQUES
DE L'tCONOMIE MIXTE 78-89 (1992). Professor Larry Ribstein has criticized the approach of this
Article on his "blog." See Larry E. Ribstein, Business Corporations as Banks: The Next Step in
Governance Reform, IDEOBLOG, Jan. 21, 2006, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/01/
business corpor.html (with additional commentary and criticisms from participants).
12. Signs of this backlash are the resistance of the business community to SEC regulatory
initiatives, see, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, No. 04-1300 (D.C. Cir. June 21, 2005)
(discussing the Chamber's challenge to SEC corporate governance initiatives with respect to
investment companies); see also Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(holding, among other things, that the SEC had violated rule-making procedures in promulgating
its governance rule for investment companies), and the appointment of Christopher Cox (a person
with a deregulatory orientation) to be Chairman of the SEC. See Deborah Solomon et al., Cox's
Nomination to Run SEC Signals a Regulatory Shift, WALL ST. J., June 3, 2005, at Al.
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regulation that already is occurring through the SEC's enhanced
enforcement powers over public firm management and the increasing
criminalization of management's behavior, and of balancing this
enforcement with guidance so that SEC regulation does not just punish
firm executives without offering them any accompanying benefits. 3
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II offers a broad but brief
overview of the history and current regulation of bank management under
federal banking laws. It explains how all-encompassing it is: Bank
regulators screen officers and directors, set standards of conduct for
management, and monitor managers on an ongoing basis and exercise
considerable informal and formal powers over them, including the power
to ban an officer or director from the banking industry for life. Again from
a broad perspective, Part HI contrasts this comprehensive bank regulation
of management with the limited regulation of public firm management
authorized to the SEC by the federal securities laws. The SEC does little
gatekeeping of public company officers and directors and sets few
standards for their conduct. Since the late 1990s, however, as a result of
waves of corporate scandals, there has been major growth in SEC and SRO
regulation of public firm management. The SEC and SROs, along with
federal prosecutors, have received significant powers to discipline and
punish officers and directors. This Part also emphasizes how Sarbanes-
Oxley, the SEC's implementing regulations, and SRO rules pursuant to
these regulations continue this process, and it discusses the reasons for the
focus on enforcement. Part IV first argues that an SEC regulation that
emphasizes enforcement with little gatekeeping, standard-setting, or
ongoing relationships with firm management, is inappropriate and unfair.
It then discusses the theoretical and practical reasons why the SEC cannot
take on a complete regulatory role toward public firm officers and
directors comparable to that of bank regulators to bank management. The
next Part describes, from a social psychological perspective, the problem
of the formation of inner circles in public firm management and the
possible solution of an outside monitor. It sets forth a proposal (as well as
possible modifications to it) that there be established corporate governance
monitors in certain public companies, using the model of bank examiners
13. An additional justification for this proposal is that ordinary people in the U.S.
increasingly invest in the stock market, as opposed to bank deposits, whether directly or indirectly
through mutual and pension funds. For example, the number of individuals owning stock either
directly or indirectly increased from 52.3 million in 1989 to 84 million in 1998. See NYSE FACT
BOOK, The Investing Public, http://www.nyse.com (now titled NYSE Facts and Figures). Under the
proposal, federal regulation of management would follow this movement of savings, for it would
extend the substantive regulation of management from financial intermediaries to the major capital
raisers, albeit in a modified form, as discussed below. See infra note 14.
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in large complex banking organizations, and presents a few examples of
existing monitors. Part V concludes the discussion.
11. AN OVERVIEW OF BANK REGULATORY SUPERVISION OF
BANK MANAGEMENT
The purpose of this Part is to give the reader a panorama of the
comprehensiveness of the substantive regulation of bank management.
This regulation falls into three parts. First, there is "gatekeeping" where
bank regulators 4 screen and preapprove the selection of officers and
directors of a new bank. Second, bank regulators set detailed standards of
conduct for bank officers and directors. Third, the bank regulators monitor,
on an ongoing basis, compliance with the standards and, together with
federal prosecutors, enforce this compliance informally and formally. To
use a metaphor, bank regulators stay with bank directors and officers from
cradle to grave.
A. Banking Regulators' Gatekeeping
Bank regulators review the qualifications and background of
individuals proposed by a group seeking to start a bank (known as an
"organizing group"'5) to be its directors and officers, and they allow into
the banking industry only those who receive their approval. Regulators
can, in effect, prevent the appointment and election of all or some of the
proposed officers and directors. To succeed in an application to obtain a
bank charter, an organizing group must have qualified and experienced
bank directors and executives to supervise and operate the institution. The
regulatory gatekeeping also includes a probationary period. During the two
years after a bank receives a charter, regulators can remove officers and
directors.' 6
The justification for this gatekeeping has always been the quasi-
governmental status of banks. Early American business corporations,
which were often formed to perform important tasks like transportation,
had this status,' 7 which banks never quite lost. Historically (and even
14. The focus of the following discussion will be only on the regulator of nationally chartered
banks, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), which has certain power over the banks to which it provides insurance for
customers' deposits up to statutory limits. See generally LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM,
REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 197-98 (2004);
MICHAELP. MALLOY, PRINCIPLES OF BANK REGULATION 27-36 (2d. ed. 2003). The FDIC's power
over state-chartered banks is particularly significant, for it is their primary regulator where a state
bank is not a member of the Federal Reserve System.
15. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(d)(6) (2005).
16. See id. § 5.20(g)(2).
17. See generally JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT
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today), a bank's public importance came from its being the primary
financial intermediary in a local economy, providing capital, investments,
and payment services for local inhabitants and businesses.18 A bank fell
within the public, and thus the government's, interest, for without its
effective functioning there would be no complex economic life, and thus
no developed social life, in a town, city, or region. Given the bank's role,
it is not at all surprising that its directors and officers were viewed almost
as public servants and their appointments required government approval.
That a bank generally held cash and other liquid assets that could easily be
stolen reinforced the need for competent and trustworthy management.19
A statement from the current FDIC Risk Management Manual of
Examination Policies demonstrates how, even today, bank regulators
consider bank management to be a public service:
Being selected to serve as a bank director is generally
regarded as an honor, for it often denotes an individual's
reputation as being successful in business or professional
endeavors, public spirited, and entitled to public trust and
confidence. It is this latter attribute and the public
accountability implicit therein that distinguishes the office of
bank director from directorships in most other corporate
enterprises. Bank directors are not only responsible to the
stockholders who elected them, but must also be concerned
with the safety of depositors' funds and the influence the bank
exercises on the community it serves.2"
The public service mission of banks, and by extension their officers and
directors, remains, even as banks and their role in the economy have
changed. Banks remain critical financial intermediaries in local
HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 43-45 (2003); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical
and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors, March 30, 2004, http://ssrn.com/
abstract=546296 (last visited June 17, 2006) (providing an overview of governance by
representation and noting that medieval towns operated as corporate entities.)
18. See generally JAMES L. PIERCE, THE FUTURE OF BANKING 17-87 (1991) (describing the
reasons for government regulation of banking and the history of banking regulation in the United
States).
19. As any student of corporations knows, many early cases on directors' fiduciary duties
deal with bank directors' failure to supervise employees who embezzled funds from customer
accounts. See, e.g., Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 677-79 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940).
20. See FDIC, DSC RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLICIES 4.1-1 (Dec.
2004), available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/index.html. The fiduciary
nature of a national bank director is emphasized by the statutory requirement that the director take
an oath before a notary public to the effect that he or she will "diligently and honestly administer
the affairs of such association, and will not knowingly violate or willingly permit to be violated any
of the provisions of [banking laws] .... See 12 U.S.C. § 73 (2000).
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economies, albeit ones connected to a more sophisticated national and
international economy. This status continues their quasi-governmental
role, even if their regulation has become exceedingly complex. This role
is underscored by federal deposit insurance. Since 1933, the federal
government, through the FDIC, insures bank deposits (up to set limits) to
safeguard the basic savings of ordinary people and thus to prevent bank
panics in times of economic stress."
The following discussion explains, from a broad perspective, the kind
of screening of officers and directors that bank regulators undertake,
although the regulatory focus has shifted from requiring them to be well-
regarded, solvent local individuals to demanding that they have financial
and banking expertise. The discussion is limited to regulatory gatekeeping
of national bank directors and officers.22 There are specific, although
somewhat archaic, requirements for national bank directors ensuring that
the directors are familiar with and sensitive to the local economy and that
they make a financial commitment to the bank: They must be U.S.
citizens, live near the bank (i.e., within 100 miles of its main office for a
year preceding their election), and own $1,000 of the bank's stock.23
Financial commitment remains important in the gatekeeping regulations.
The initial directors (or some of them) should have the financial resources
to keep the bank afloat, if necessary.24 The OCC explains that "[p]ersonal
wealth is not a prerequisite to becoming an organizer or director of a
national bank."'2 However, it plainly wants each director to make some
financial commitment (keyed to an individual's resources), as well as other
21. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, THE DIRECTOR'S BOOK: THE ROLE OF A
NATIONAL BANK DIRECTOR 2 (1997), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/director.pdf
(explaining bank regulation partly as a result of the provision of deposit insurance).
22. State bank regulators similarly screen state bank managers, as does the FDIC. See, e.g.,
STATE OF N. Y. BANKING DEP'T, INFORMATION AND PROCEDURE FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF A
COMMERCIAL BANK UNDER NEW YORK BANKING LAW 1-2, 7-8, available at
http://www.banking.state.ny.us (emphasizing the importance of directors and chief executives in
application).
23. See 12 U.S.C. § 72 (2000) (listing requirements). The OCC has the power to waive the
first requirement for a minority of directors of an institution and the second requirement for all
directors. See generally COMPTROLLER'S LICENSING MANUAL, DIRECTOR WAIVERS 1-4 (June
2002), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/corpbook/group3/public/pdf/dirwaiv.pdf(describing
the requirements, the policies regarding waivers, and the procedures for obtaining the waivers); see
also PATRICIA A. MCCOY, BANKING LAW MANUAL § 14.02 (2004).
24. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(g)(3) (2005) (explaining that directors should have a financial
commitment to the bank); see also DOUGLAS V. AUSTIN ET AL., HOW TO CHARTER A COMMERCIAL
BANK 702 (1999) ("If the plan is to raise the money for the bank charter primarily from a small
group of individuals, then the incorporators should be affluent.").
25. See COMPTROLLER'S LICENSING MANUAL, CHARTERS 13 (Jan. 2005), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/corpbook/group4/public/pdf/charters.pdf.
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW
contributions within his or her area of expertise, to the bank.26 To qualify
as a bank director means having the ability and willingness to give
something back to the community.
Today, regulators pre-screen management to see if the proposed
directors and officers are competent in banking, rather than just local
notables. In its chartering regulations, the OCC requires that an applicant
have competent executives and a board of directors27 capable of executing
the bank's business plan.2" Members of the bank's organizing group
generally serve as its initial directors,29 and the OCC stipulates that the
group be composed of competent, experienced, financially astute, and
diverse individuals.3" The OCC also prefers that at least one-fourth of the
bank's outside directors have previous experience as directors or
executives of a financial institution.3' If the experience of the board is not
satisfactory to it, the OCC may accept a plan of director education as a
way for the organizing group to meet the OCC's requirements.32
The board's major responsibility is to select management that has
"integrity, technical competence, character, and experience in the financial
services industry."33 The CEO, who must have banking experience, must
be named in the application and attend the preliminary meetings between
the OCC and the organizing group. 4 The OCC will not approve a charter
on the condition that a suitable CEO be named in the future.35 The OCC
states that bank senior executives should be "strong," which means
"[h]igh-caliber senior executive officers that have the relevant experience
necessary to implement the proposed business plan and to exercise
corrective action in response to changing internal and external factors. 36
26. See id. at 12-13.
27. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(f)(2)(B) (2005) (explaining the OCC considers whether the
applicant "[h]as competent management, including a board of directors, with ability and experience
relevant to the types of services to be provided"); see also COMPTROLLER'S LICENSING MANUAL,
CHARTERS, supra note 25, at 7-11 (emphasizing the importance of experienced and competent bank
directors and executives for receiving the charter); AUSTIN, supra note 24, at 701-02.
28. See COMPTROLLER'S LICENSING MANUAL, CHARTERS, supra note 25, at 8.
29. See id. at 3. The organizing group must be made up of at least five natural persons. See
12 U.S.C. § 21 (2000). A national bank must have at least five, and no more than twenty-five,
directors. See id. § 7 a.
30. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(g)(1) (2005) ("Strong organizing groups generally include diverse
business and financial interests and community involvement."); see also COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY, THE DIRECTOR'S BOOK, supra note 2 1, at 5 (discussing the requirements for a director).
31. See COMPTROLLER'S LICENSING MANUAL, CHARTERS, supra note 25, at 9.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 8.
34. See id. at 10. The OCC characterizes the CEO's selection as the most important decision
of the organizing group. See id. at 9.
35. See id. at 10.
36. See id. at 8.
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The OCC preapproves all senior executives in addition to the CEO, and no
executive can be employed over the OCC's objection.37
All proposed officers, directors, controlling shareholders, and
organizing group members must file a biographical and financial report
with bank regulators.38 The form requires, among other things, information
on the background, work experience, business and banking affiliations of
the person, history of legal or administrative sanctions of the person and
organizations that the applicant has been associated with, and a detailed
personal financial report of his or her assets and liabilities.39 The OCC then
conducts a background check on the person on the basis of the filing, using
government and public records, as well as having the FBI check its records
for the person's fingerprints." The OCC explains that the background
investigation is designed "to determine if those proposed have the
experience, competence, integrity, character, financial ability, and
willingness to direct and/or lead a bank's affairs in a safe, sound, and legal
manner.
' 41
The OCC's gatekeeping also involves an onsite review of directors and
officers. Under the required chartering procedure, OCC officials first
generally hold a preliminary meeting with members of the organizing
37. See id. at 11; see also 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(h)(3) (2005); AUSTIN, supra note 24, at 701-02
("Since FIRREA and FDICIA, the regulatory agencies have a much stronger voice in the
determination of appropriate directors and management, and they can eliminate directors and
officers without even an administrative hearing."). Again, the OCC can remove any officer or
director for two years following the date the bank begins business. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(g)(2)
(2005).
38. See COMPTROLLER'S LICENSING MANUAL, BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS 1-2 (June
2002), available athttp://www.occ.treas.gov/corpbook/groupl/public/pdf/backgrnd.pdf. This report
is pursuant to a form jointly adopted by financial regulators. See INTERAGENCY BIOGRAPHICAL
AND FINANCIAL REPORT (expiratory date Oct. 31, 2007), http://www.occ.treas.gov/efiles/diskl/
BankForms/bio.pdf (consisting of an approximately sixteen-page model form). The form allows
an applicant to use another format as long as all information demanded by the form is present and
the applicant certifies its accuracy. See id.
39. See COMPTROLLER'S LICENSING MANUAL, BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS, supra note
38; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1829(a)(1) (2000) (prohibiting those convicted of crimes involving
dishonesty, breach of trust, or money laundering from serving as officers or directors of any FDIC
insured financial institution).
40. See COMPTROLLER'S LICENSING MANUAL, BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS, supra note
38, at 2-3.
41. Id. at 1. A false filing in a report by any person may result in the denial of the charter and
sanctions, including criminal penalties, against the filer. See id. at 2; see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001(a)(2) (2000) (criminalizing false statements). The OCC may waive a background check if
a proposed director or officer is already affiliated with another financial institution. See
COMPTROLLER'S LICENSING MANUAL, BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 38, at 5; AUSTIN,




group.42 After the charter application is filed, the OCC conducts a field
investigation of the proposed bank and, if it is satisfied, it grants
preliminary approval, which enables bank capital-raising and organization
to commence.43 The OCC's step-by-step checklist of the organizational
process places considerable emphasis upon continuous regulatory review
of management." During the organizational phase, moreover, the
spokesperson for the organizing group must alert the OCC to any
significant changes in the application, which would include any change in
directors, the CEO, or other officers (as well as any new or updated
background information about them).4" Bank directors and officers are also
warned that the OCC will monitor them after the chartering.'
It is important not to overemphasize bank regulatory gatekeeping of
management, for chartering itself is a small part of the OCC's activities.
The OCC spent only 3.2% of its resources on chartering in its 2005 fiscal
year.47 During 2005, the OCC approved three charter applications and
conditionally approved seventeen (conditional approval is the most
42. See COMPTROLLER'S LICENSING MANUAL, CHARTERS, supra note 25, at 24-25.
43. See id. at 31-32. This is the "organizational phase" before the bank opens for business.
See id.
44. See id. at 66-68 (discussing the investigation of proposed management officials, as well
as regulatory process to invite the proposed officer or director to rebut negative information about
himself or herself, including through interviews). The OCC also examines the proposed
compensation of the organizers, directors and officers and determines whether it is reasonable. See
id. at 13. It considers excessive compensation to be an unsafe or unsound practice and will
disapprove a charter application for inappropriate compensation. See id. at 15.
45. See id. at 37-38.
46. See id. at 89-94; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1831 (I) (2000) (dictating that bank regulators must
receive notice of, and pre-approve, any change of a director or officer of an inadequately
capitalized or troubled institution); id. § 5.5 1(d) (requiring notice and approval be no later than
ninety days prior to the person's assuming the position). The OCC explains that it can disapprove
of an officer or director proposed in this situation if the appointment or election would be against
the best interests of the institution. See id. § 5.5 1(e)(4) (authorizing disapproval for issues of
"competence, experience, character, or integrity"); see also COMPTROLLER'S LICENSING MANUAL,
CHANGES IN DIRECTORS AND SENIOR ExEcUTIvE OFFICERS 2 (Jan. 2003), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/corpbook/group3/public/pdf/ChangesinDirectorSEO.pdf (noting that it
"will scrutinize more closely a person with previous banking experience in a failed or troubled
financial institution").
47. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2005, ENSURING
A SAFE AND SOUND NATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM FOR ALL AMERICANS 34 (Oct. 2005), available
at http://www.occ.treas.gov/annrpt/annual.htm (costing $15 million); see also COMPTROLLER OF
THE CURRENCY, ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2004, THE NATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM:
BACKBONE OF A STRONG U.S. ECONOMY 25 (Oct. 2004), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/
annrpt/annual.htm (noting that it spent only 4% of its resources on chartering in that fiscal year for
a cost of$16.4 million); COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2003,
THE VALUE OF A NATIONAL BANK CHARTER 11 (Nov. 2003), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/annrptlannual.htm (noting costs of $11.6 million and $11.3 million,
respectively, in 2003 and 2002).
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common outcome).48 Its charter denials, which are infrequent,49
occasionally are based upon its screening of management, when it
determines that the organizing group, directors, or officers (or all three) are
incompetent or not the proper persons to operate a national bank. ° In its
denial of a charter application in 2003, for example, the OCC concluded
that the proposed senior executives, who had banking and executive
experience, did not have sufficient experience in their designated executive
positions in the proposed bank.5 Even when it conditionally approves a
48. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2005, supra note
47, at 35; see also COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ANNUAL REPORT: FIsCAL YEAR 2004, supra
note 47, at 26 (approving nine charter applications and conditionally approving twenty-seven).
During 2003, it received twenty-nine applications for a charter (the same as in 2002), approved one,
and conditionally approved thirteen. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ANNUAL REPORT:
FISCAL YEAR 2003, supra note 47, at 22. It appears that fourteen applications were withdrawn, and
some of these withdrawals are no doubt due to regulators' problems with proposed bank
management. See id.
49. Published OCC decisions show that there was no denial of an application in calendar
years 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002 and 2005, one denial each in 2001 and 2003, and two each in 1997
and 2004. See Comptroller of the Currency, http://www.occ.treas.gov/interp/monthly.htm (last
visited May 13, 2006).
50. Because confidential information is often extracted, it is not always easy to determine
why an application was denied from the published decisions of the OCC. See Comptroller of the
Currency: Corporate Applications, http://www.occ.treas.gov/interp/monthly.htm (last visited June
26, 2006). Yet it is sometimes possible from these edited decisions to conclude that the OCC denied
a particular application because of its concerns over management. For example, as the OCC stated
in Signature Bank of California, OCC Corporate Decision 2004-4, 2004 WL 370732 (O.C.C.) at
1 (Jan. 15, 2004):
In evaluating an application to charter a national bank, the OCC considers, in part,
whether the proposed bank has competent management, including a board of
directors, with ability and experience relevant to the types of services to be
provided by the bank. [deleted material] This also results in our finding that the
senior executive officers are unable to compensate for the limited banking
experience of the proposed board of directors.
Id. See also OCC Corporate Decision 2001-9, Security National Bank (Apr. 18, 2001), available
at 2001 OCC Ltr. LEXIS 20 (observing that "[t]he organizing group failed to select and/or identify
management skills needed to successfully offer the proposed line of bank products and services");
OCC Corporate Decision 1997-64, First Value Bank, National Ass'n (July 14, 1997) (denying this
application and discussing how the organizers, including the proposed bank chief executives, were
unfamiliar with the proposed operating plan).
51. See OCC Corporate Decision 2003-8, Re: Rock Asia Capital Bank, 2-4 (June 18, 2003).
In that decision, the OCC explained:
Generally, strong charter proposals include executive officers that have served
in a similar position in another bank, which was operated in a safe and sound
manner. If the officer candidate has not served in the same or a similar position,
we expect the candidate to possess comparable experience or skills relevant to the
2006]
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charter application, the OCC may impose conditions mandating changes
to bank management that an organizing group must meet to receive the
charter.52
position. If the officer lacks relevant experience, the OCC assesses the strength of
the officer by considering the extent of the proposed candidate's experience, his
or her skill set for the position, and the complexity of the bank's business plan.
After considering the qualifications of the proposed officers, the OCC determined
that the overall management team was not strong.
While all of the three officer candidates-for chief executive officer (CEO),
chief credit officer (CCO) and chief financial officer (CFO)--have banking
experience, none have served in their particular role before. As the candidates are
currently employed elsewhere, their names are not noted here.
The proposed CEO is a senior executive vice president of a large California
bank with 20 years of prior banking experience. He has not been the CEO of a
bank before, although he has extensive experience in management of the bank's
branching network, and presently is head of the bank's commercial lending
division. If a candidate for CEO has not served as a CEO before, the OCC, as
here, evaluates other factors to determine if the overall management team is strong
to compensate for any limited experience by a proposed officer.
The proposed CCO has prior banking experience. However, he has not been
employed by a bank since 1994, and has not originated a loan since that time, so
he lacks recent relevant direct experience. He has never served as the CCO of a
bank before. In our interview with the proposed CCO, he stated that he will not
directly supervise any of the lending staff and that he will not originate any loans
himself. Given this employment record, and as a result of information obtained
during our interview of the candidate, we do not believe that the proposed CCO
could function in that role without support from others.
The proposed CFO has extensive experience as a bank cashier and controller.
However, she has never served as a bank's CFO. For the last four years she has
worked as the CFO of a non-bank investment company. She has limited
experience in bank asset/liability management and has never managed a bank
investment portfolio. We do not believe the proposed CFO could function in that
role without support from others.
Id. See generally OCC Corporate Decision 1997-59, Re: Application to Charter Banco de
Prestamos National Bank (July 7, 1997) (expressing similar concerns about applicant's
management).
52. See, e.g., OCC Conditional Approval 633, Re: Charter Application, T Bank National
Ass'n, 2-3 (Apr. 16, 2004) ("T Bank shall, if required by the Assistant Deputy Comptroller, Dallas
North Field Office, establish a single ChiefFinancial Officer (CFO) position and hire an individual
satisfactory to the OCC to fill the position."). It is beyond the scope of this Article to examine the
chartering decisions of state banking regulators. However, an organizing group seeking a state bank
charter would generally need to apply as well to the FDIC to obtain deposit insurance, unless it was
uninterested in accepting retail deposits. Like the OCC, the FDIC may reject an application for
insurance because of its concerns over the ability, experience, or character of the chartering bank's
management, and its rejection essentially amounts to a denial of a charter. The FDIC web site
provides access to its decisions. See FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders,
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/enforcement/index.html (last visited May 20, 2006). In a few
of the decisions that deal with a rejection of an application for insurance, the rejection was premised
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My point in this overview of bank regulatory gatekeeping is simple.
Those who are named as officers and directors in a charter application
become acquainted with bank regulators during the chartering and are
aware that they will be subject to regulatory scrutiny-not just during the
application process but so long as they remain in their positions with the
bank. The officers and directors also learn that, because banks are
informed with the public interest, there are governmentally-established
standards of conduct for them and bank regulators will monitor their
compliance with these standards.
B. Banking Regulators' Standard Setting, Monitoring of Management,
and Enforcement of Managerial Standards
Bank regulators' oversight of bank directors and officers does not end
once a bank is chartered. It continues so long as the individuals are in their
respective positions. Regulators establish detailed standards of conduct for
directors and officers and monitor individual compliance with them. If
directors and officers fail to meet the standards, regulators can take
disciplinary action against them, which can include suspension and
removal from the financial institution and even a lifelong ban from the
industry. They can also refer the matter to federal prosecutors. The
following subsections give a broad overview of the standards and discuss
the bank regulatory monitoring of compliance with, and enforcement of,
those standards.
1. Standards of Conduct for Bank Directors and Officers
Historically, the standards of conduct for bank officers and directors
were straightforward because they reflected the relative simplicity of a
banking business that consisted primarily of taking deposits and making
commercial loans. Bank directors and officers were to supervise and
manage these activities and not benefit personally from their positions.53
As time has passed, however, the business of banking has changed
significantly because banks and their affiliates increasingly have been
allowed to engage in other kinds of financial, and even commercial,
upon the shortcomings of proposed management. See, e.g., In re Application for Federal Deposit
Insurance, Bank of Michigan, Denial of Petition for Reconsideration, FDIC 94-162aa (Oct. 18,
1994) (denying application for insurance because individual who would be chairman, CEO, and
controlling shareholder of applicant had previously been disciplined in his employment with a
national bank for commingling personal and banking assets). The lack of denials, as in the case of
OCC chartering decisions, may reflect elimination of organizing groups with questionable proposed
management early in the state chartering process, which means that the FDIC rarely has to take this
drastic action.
53. See Helen A. Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A Perspective on Bank Regulation in
a DeregulatoryAge, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 501, 521 (1989).
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activities.5 4 As a result of this change, bank regulators take two approaches
to the standards of conduct. First, partly in response to management
scandals, they have added more detailed standards." Second, they have left
some management behavior, as well as the institution's activity, to self-
regulation by the bank.56
The standards of conduct for bank directors are those expected of a
director of any business, though they are adjusted for banks' traditional
lending and deposit-taking, and are familiar to a student of corporate law.57
They include the basics of the duty of care: to know and keep informed
about the bank's business environment, which includes its peculiar legal
environment; to hire and supervise competent management; to adopt an
appropriate committee structure, including committees either required or
customary for a bank's business; to engage in ongoing monitoring of
management and the bank through the use of internal and external control
systems; to oversee business performance; and to serve community credit
needs.58 In effect, banking regulators tell directors to supervise their bank's
business and then to explain to them what the business is.59 The regulators
emphasize that a director must comply with the other "classic" director's
duty: to place the institution's interests above the director's own, that is,
to avoid conflicts of interest.60 In this regard, bank regulators enumerate
54. The culmination ofthis process was in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization
Act, which allowed banks and their holding companies to enter a broad range of financial activities
through a special bank subsidiary or the affiliates of what is now called a financial holding
company. See Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15,
16, 18 U.S.C.).
55. See Garten, supra note 53, at 546.
56. See id. at 549-50 (questioning whether, as bank activities become broader, bank
regulators can keep up with monitoring); McCoy, supra note 23, at § 1.04.
57. Federal banking authorities provide directors with publications that set forth the basic
standards of behavior expected of them. See, e.g., COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, THE
DIRECTOR'S BOOK, supra note 21; FDIC, POCKET GUIDE FOR DIRECTORS (reprinted Feb. 2003),
available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/directors/index.html [hereinafter FDIC,
POCKET GUIDE]; see also DOUGLAS V. AUSTIN, FINANCIAL INSTITUTION DIRECTOR'S HANDBOOK
(1999).
58. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, THE DIRECTOR'S BOOK, supra note 21, at 19, 23,
25, 31, 36, 43; FDIC, POCKET GUIDE, supra note 57, at "Keep Informed"; see also AUSTIN, supra
note 57, at 22-24,30,33-38; COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, THE DIRECTOR'S BOOK,supra note
21, at 70-73 (telling a bank director that he or she should attend meetings, review materials
beforehand, ask questions and investigate, understand audits or any communication from a
regulator, and exercise independent judgment).
59. For example, the OCC explains at length that banking is about managing risks and then
describes the kinds of risks that face a bank. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, THE
DIRECTOR'S BOOK, supra note 21, at 10-15, 49-64 (identifying the main policies in the banking
business).
60. See id. at 73-76, 79; AUSTIN, supra note 57, at 47.
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the insider abuses that a bank director should avoid.6 Since, moreover, an
important duty of bank directors is to comply with banking law, bank
regulators explain to directors the laws that apply to a bank's traditional
businesses.62
As the business of banking evolves and becomes more complex, bank
regulators establish more standards and policies for directors and officers
with respect to a bank's expanded activities. However, they have often
done so belatedly, and only after the activities have led to bank failures or
to other serious banking problems.63 A notable example in this regard is
the requirement of an internal control system that permits bank managers
to monitor the bank's activities and their compliance with the law. A bank
must have a system of internal controls, the effectiveness of which is
certified in a report by the CEO and the CFO of the bank, who also attest
to their responsibility for preparing financial statements and to the bank's
compliance with laws assuring its safety and soundness. ' The same law
calls for banks to have a board audit committee composed of outside,
independent directors who review bank management's reports, an
independent accounting firm's evaluation of those reports, and that firm's
audits of the bank.65
61. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, THE DIRECTOR'S BOOK, supra note 21, at 64-67;
FDIC, POCKET GUIDE, supra note 57, at "Avoid Preferential Transactions."
62. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, THE DIRECTOR'S BOOK, supra note 21, at 83-93.
63. For example, in 1991 Congress mandated that federal banking regulators develop
standards to maintain the "safety and soundness" of their regulated institutions. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 1831 p- 1 (2000) (as added by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA)
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2267). These safety and soundness standards were
promulgated by financial regulators in 1995 and are found at 12 C.F.R. § 364 (2005).
64. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831 m(b) (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 363.2(b), app. A (2005); see also id. § 363,
app. A (2005). See also 12 U.S.C. § 1831 m(c) (2000) (requiring independent public accountants
to report on management's certification on internal controls); 12 C.F.R. § 363.3(b) (2005). This
certification requirement, too, was added in 1991 by FDICIA in response to scandals in financial
institutions where bank management was found not to be monitoring expanded activities in the
institution. It presaged the management certification obligations that would be imposed on public
firm CEOs and CFOs a decade later by Sarbanes-Oxley. See McCoY, supra note 23, at §
14.04[c][1]; infra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
65. See 12 U.S.C. § 183 1m(g) (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 363.5(a), app. A (2005). In addition, a
large depository institution (having assets over $3 billion) must have an audit committee, composed
of outside, independent directors, with at least two members with banking and financial
management expertise, with its own outside counsel, and this committee cannot include
representatives of bank customers. See 12 U.S.C. § 183 1m(g)(l)(c) (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 363.5(b),
app. A (2005). In 1996, Congress amended the statute to allow the FDIC to promulgate rules
allowing the composition of an audit committee of large institutions to be made up of only a
majority of outside independent directors. See Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-419. Yet the FDIC declined to
exercise its authority on this subject, because it failed to find a problem with the committee
composition. See FDIC Independent Audits and Reporting Requirements, 62 Fed. Reg. 63,256,
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Bank regulators give bank directors simplified guidelines about internal
controls and the typical problems those controls may reveal. In one
guidebook, the OCC explains the fundamentals of internal controls and
provides a basic questionnaire that will help directors understand whether
their institution's controls are adequate.66 In a more recent guidebook, the
OCC warns directors about the changing nature of banking and the
enhanced need for them to monitor their institutions for significant risks.67
It then reviews measures of banking financial performance and warns
directors about specific problems (red flags) that the measures can reveal.68
The red flags identified by the OCC are sometimes amusing. For example,
bank regulators ask directors to investigate whenever key employees
decline to take a vacation! 69
Indeed, the bank regulatory guidelines for officers and directors are
comprehensive in their coverage of each aspect of a bank's business and
are constantly updated to deal with new activities approved for banks. The
OCC provides a handbook that is primarily designed to guide bank
examiners in their reviews of banks, though it also provides
recommendations to bank management to help guide their business
decisions and legal compliance.7 ° The handbook covers every kind of bank
business, from liabilities to capital and assets.71 From time to time,
moreover, bank regulators provide special advice on bank activities that
pose particular problems.72
63,256 (Nov. 28, 1997); MCCOY, supra note 23, at § 14.04 n.247.
66. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, INTERNAL CONTROLS: A GUIDE FOR DIRECTORS
3-4, 7 (2000), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/IntCtrl.pdf (questioning directors about their
internal control system and their access to information about compliance or noncompliance with
an institution's policies and procedures).
67. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, DETECTING RED FLAGS IN BOARD REPORTS: A
GUIDE FOR DIRECTORS 1 (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/rf book.pdf
68. See id. at 7 (identifying possible problems with capital ratios), 9-10 (noting red flags
about loan portfolio), 13 (discussing problems in asset growth, including growth through products
for which the institution has little expertise), 22-23 (explaining warnings about interest rate risks
and problems involving the bank's investment portfolio), 26-27 (identifying problems in banks'
increasing use of off-balance sheet activities and derivatives), 29-30 (discussing potential warning
signs of derivatives, including use of complex or illiquid derivative contracts), 32 (noting red flags
concerning asset securitization deals).
69. See id. at 37 (noting red flag of employees in key positions not going on vacation or not
being absent for two consecutive weeks during the year). The implication here is that, if employees
are reluctant to go on vacation, they may be engaged in fraud, for they would fear that someone
might discover their improper dealings while they were on vacation.
70. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK: INTRODUCTION 4
(July 1994), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/intro.pdf.
71. These are mainly found under the sections of the Comptroller's Handbook dealing with
safety and soundness. See generally COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK: SAFETY & SOUNDNESS (July
1994), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/SS.htm.
72. See, e.g., Interagency Statement on Sound Practices Concerning Complex Structured
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Bank regulators, however, have acknowledged their own supervisory
limitations, particularly with respect to large banking organizations
engaged in an ever-growing number of financial activities.73 They
generally allow these institutions to develop their own systems of self-
supervision, subject to the regulators' oversight.74 Given the increasingly
complex financial activities of the large banking organizations and
the difficulties that bank regulators have keeping up with the activities
and rapidly changing market practices, regulators encourage
the organizations to produce their own risk assessments and supervisory
guidelines.75 They hope that practices and guidelines that prove
particularly effective in one large banking organization then can be used
as supervisory models for others.76 This self-supervision does not relieve
bank officers and directors of responsibility, but may in fact increase it.
They are expected to understand their organization's supervisory policies
and to have concluded that they are adequate for their institution.77
2. Monitoring and Enforcement of
Compliance with the Standards
The final form of regulatory oversight of bank management involves
(i) monitoring and examination and (ii) discipline and enforcement. Again,
the point here is only to suggest how extensive each category is, not to
discuss each exhaustively. Monitoring basically occurs through bank
examinations. Under the law, these on-site examinations must take place
each year, although smaller institutions may be examined during an
eighteen-month cycle.78 Examinations, in turn, can lead to enforcement
because problems that surface during the examination, including problems
Finance Activities, 69 Fed. Reg. 28,980 (May 19,2004) (providing guidance on structured finance).
73. See GAO, FINANCIAL REGATION: INDUSTRY CHANGES PROMPTNEED TO RECONSIDER U.S.
REGULATORY STRUCTURE, GAO-05-61, at 46-51 (Oct. 2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d0561.pdf.
74. Id. at 90-91.
75. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK: LARGE BANK
SUPERVISION 5 (May 2001), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/lbs.pdf.
76. See, e.g., Lisa M. DeFerrari & David E. Palmer, Supervision of Large Complex Banking
Organizations, 87 FED. RES. BUL. 47,47 (Feb. 2001).
77. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the US. Financial Services Industry,
1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 454-75
(criticizing this regulatory approach to the supervision of large complex banking organizations).
78. See 12 U.S.C. § 1820(d) (2000); see also COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK: EXAMINATION PLANNING AND CONTROL 1,4 (July 1997), available
at http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/epc.pdf (discussing how examinations of large banks may
be ongoing throughout the 12-month cycle, while smaller banks may be examined either on a 12-
or 18-month cycle, depending upon their asset base (less than $250 million in asset base and lack
of supervisory problems qualifies for the 18-month cycle)).
with bank management, can result in penalties to the bank and discipline
of individual officers and directors.7 9
Bank examinations underscore the close relationships between bank
management and bank regulators, who through the examiners are literally
looking over management's shoulder. A central part of the examination
involves an evaluation and rating of the quality of bank officers and
directors and their decision-making.8" The examiner evaluates, for
example, the executives' formulation of policies, with board approval, for
the bank,8" their supervision of personnel,82 the development of internal
control systems, including auditing and compliance with bank policies,83
and the use and quality of management information systems for both
financial and nonfinancial information." The examiner rates
management's decision-making and, if necessary, makes recommendations
for informal or formal action.85
The Comptroller's Handbook specifies how an examiner should assess
a bank's directors.86 It explains the expectations with respect to the
conduct of directors87 and alerts an examiner to the negligence and abuses
for which to look. The examiner, who must rate the board's behavior,
evaluates the adequacy of board decision-making by looking at the
information the board receives and the extent of its deliberation about
issues placed before it (or the absence of important issues placed before
it).88 The examiner looks at such mundane, but indicative, factors as
attendance of a director at board meetings and domination of meetings by
a particular director or group of directors.89 He or she also looks at how the
board sets executive compensation, whether it has an adequate committee
structure, whether the board fulfills all statutory requirements with respect
to it and its members, whether it has complied with any prior
79. In 2005 the OCC spent 83.4% of its resources, or $420.3 million, on bank supervision.
See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2005, supra note 47, at 13.
80. See COMPTROLLEROFTHE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK: MANAGEMENT AND
BOARD PROCESSES 1 (Mar. 1990), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/
Management 1 .pdf.
81. See id. at 5-6.
82. See id. at 6.
83. See id. at 7-9.
84. See id. at l0-11.
85. See id. at 25-26.
86. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK: DUTIES AND
RESPONSIBITIES OFDIRECrORS 7-8 (Mar. 1990), availableathttp://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/
directors 1.pdf. There is no comparable section for management, but management is involved in all
aspects of a bank's operations, and all parts of the Handbook thus ultimately guide the examiner's
evaluation of it.
87. See id. at 2-5 (describing the duties).
88. See id. at 9-12.
89. See id. at 12.
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administrative directives, and whether it has a proper relationship with its
shareholders.9"
The bank examination is, in fact, the first step in enforcement. Before
the examination begins, the examiner generally meets with the CEO, other
senior executives, and board members to discuss the examination and its
objectives.9' After the examination, the examiner conducts a meeting with
top bank executives 92 and then prepares a report for the board in which he
or she recommends any necessary supervisory action, which can be either
informal or formal.93 A senior official of the banking agency's supervisory
office then meets with the board to discuss the report and any
recommendations or requirements for the bank to take corrective action.94
The close relationship between monitoring and enforcement is even more
pronounced in large complex banking institutions.95 Under current policy,
these institutions have a full-time examiner who often has an office within
the bank; in essence, the monitoring and discipline of the bank never end.96
Bank regulators have considerable disciplinary powers available if they
90. See id. at 12-21.
91. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK: EXAMINATION
PLANNING AND CONTROL, supra note 78, at 10.
92. See id. at 12.
93. See id. This report includes the overall rating of the institution, and the component ratings
in the "CAMEL" system, as well as a risk assessment of the institution and its components.
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK: BANK SUPERVISION PROCESS 26
(Apr. 1996), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/banksup.pdf. Under the "CAMEL"
examination rating system, one aspect of the examination (the "M") produces a rating of
management. Id. at 2-3. The nature of the regulatory action depends upon the seriousness of the
problem. For a deficiency in the bank's operation that is not serious, informal discussions with and
commitments from bank management to take care of a problem may suffice, and the problem will
not even be mentioned in an examination report. See id. at 38.
94. See COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK: EXAMINATION PLANNING AND CONTROL, supra note
78, at 14. In a small bank, only the examiner and a field officer of that office attend the board
meeting. The respective roles of examiner-in-charge (EIC), portfolio manager (who oversees other
banks), and the supervisory office are discussed in COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK: BANK SUPERVISION PROCESS. See supra note 93, at 10, 40-42.
Essentially, the EIC manages the examination (with the help of other examiners) and, if necessary,
makes conclusions about a supervisory strategy. The supervisory plan is then approved by the
OCC's supervisory office. Any such action is based upon the assessment of risks of the institutions
and their likely decrease or increase. See id. at 22 (noting that there are different risk assessments
for larger banks). The board members understand that they are responsible for implementing the
corrective plan. See id. at 34. The bank can appeal to an OCC ombudsmen if it disagrees with the
examination findings. See id. at 44; see also AUSTIN, supra note 57, at 131-32 (recommending the
following to banks in responding to examinations: "The reality is-if you fight, you lose. If you
cooperate, you will live to work another day. You can gain more ground from extended cooperation
than through confrontation.").
95. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK: LARGE BANK
SUPERVISION, supra note 75, at 1.
96. Id.
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are dissatisfied with management's conduct.97 Congress greatly increased
this power, both as a result of banking scandals in the 1980s and as a
necessary counterweight to the expansion of banking powers and activities
at that time.98 The scandals demonstrated that bank directors and
executives took advantage of the regulators' reluctance to pursue formal
enforcement actions in court-the main discipline then available to
regulators-if they were unlikely to be quickly resolved.99 Accordingly,
the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989
(FIRREA)'00 and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement
Act of 1991 (FDICIA)'° l expanded the administrative enforcement powers
of bank regulators, particularly with respect to bank officers and
directors.'02
The heart of these powers lies in 12 U.S.C. § 1818.103 This section,
which both FIRREA and FDICIA enhanced, empowers bank regulators to
seek "cease-and-desist" orders against officers and directors (among
others) for any "unsafe or unsound practice in conducting the business
of ... [a] depository institution" or for a violation of "a law, rule, or
regulation, or any condition imposed in writing by the agency."'' " These
97. See, e.g., MACEY ET AL., supra note 4, at 661-722 (giving examples of regulator's
enforcement power).
98. See AUSTIN, supra note 57, at 119-23; McCoY, supra note 23, at § 6.02[1] (discussing
safety and soundness guidelines). As Professor McCoy discusses, the enhanced prudential
supervision was accompanied by other forms of bank regulation, including regulation through
capital requirements and through transactions with affiliates and lending limits. See MCCoY,supra
note 23, at § 6.02 (discussing capital), at § 6.04 (discussing lending limits), and at § 6.05
(explaining transactions with affiliates).
99. See McCoy, supra note 23, at § 13.01 (noting how formal regulation resulted in severe
penalties for individuals), § 13.02 (noting that private parties manipulated the informal agreement
process to their benefit); see also AUSTIN, supra note 57, at 121 ("Although there are still some
elements of discretionary management, regulators are allowed far less freedom and leeway than
before 1989 and 1991.").
100. Pub. L. No. 101-173, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in various sections of 12, 15, and 18
U.S.C.).
101. See supra note 63.
102. But see Garten, supra note 53, at 549-50 (questioning whether bank regulators with their
new disciplinary powers can adequately keep up with bank managers with their expanded bank
powers).
103. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (2000).
104. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (2000). This subsection was added in 1966 by Pub. L. 89-695,
title II, sec. 202, 204, Oct. 16, 1966, 80 Stat. 1046, 1054. It was expanded by FIRREA to reach
beyond officers and directors to "institution affiliated parties" (which would include outside
professionals working for the bank). See McCoY, supra note 23, § 13.03[l][a]. On the definition
of "unsafe and unsound practices," see Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Fiduciary Duties'Demanding
Cousin: BankDirectorLiabilityfor Unsafe or Unsound Banking Practices, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
175, 196-211 (1995) (discussing the formulation and application of the standards). FDICIA
mandated that bank regulators adopt standards for safety and soundness, see 12 U.S.C. § 183 lp- 1
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orders are issued in an administrative proceeding before an administrative
law judge. "5 Contrary to its name, the order can also require an institution
or person to take affirmative action (as opposed to refraining from action),
such as requiring a bank to employ "qualified officers or employees.' 10 6
Because obtaining a cease-and-desist order can take time, with a notice of
charges followed by a hearing, § 1818 empowers bank regulators to issue
a temporary cease-and-desist order if the institution is threatened.0 7
Among the most significant powers of bank regulators is the authority
to suspend, remove and permanently ban officers and directors. The power
to remove officers and directors has been available to regulators since
1933,108 although FIRREA and FDICIA have considerably enhanced it. If
a bank regulator determines (i) that an officer or director has violated the
law, engaged in an unsafe or unsound practice, or violated his or her
fiduciary duty, (ii) that the act or omission has injured the institution or its
depositors, and (iii) that it involves personal dishonesty or willful or
continuing disregard for the safety and soundness of the institution, the
regulator may seek an order to remove the officer or director.109 As in a
cease-and-desist order, the law of removal provides for a hearing before
an administrative judge" 10 and also for a temporary suspension whereby an
agency can remove an officer or director pending the hearing.1"' Moreover,
if an officer or director (or bank employee) is indicted for a felony
involving dishonesty or a breach of trust, the banking regulator summarily
(2000), including standards defining excessive executive compensation, § 183 lp- 1 (c)(1)(a), which
they collectively did in 1995. See supra note 63. Under § 1818(b)(8), an unsatisfactory rating as
to management in a bank examination counts as an unsafe and unsound practice, if the problem
remains uncorrected. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(8) (2000).
105. See id. § 1818(e)(4).
106. See id. § 1818(b)(6)(E).
107. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c) (2004). Under the cease-and-desist procedure, a hearing is held
before an administrative law judge no sooner than thirty days after the filing of the charges. Id.
§ 1818(b)(1). The decision is issued no later than ninety days after final submission of the matter
to the agency involved. Id. § 1818(h)(1). A subject of an order may appeal it to the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Id. § 1818(h)(2). For expedited relief, upon filing of a notice of the
cease-and-desist charge, the agency can issue a temporary order, directing negative or affirmative
action on the part of the target, which becomes final (pending completion of the cease-and-desist
proceeding) unless appealed to a federal district court within ten days; if it stands, it continues until
conclusion of the cease-and-desist proceeding. See id. § 1818(c)(1).
108. See McCoY, supra note 23, § 13.03[6]; Schooner, supra note 104, at 188 (noting that,
in 1933, banking law authorized removal of directors for unsafe or unsound banking practices and
citing the Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162, 193-94).
109. 12 U.S.C.S. § 1818(e) (2006).
110. Section 1818(e)(4) establishes the procedure, which is similar to the cease-and-desist
proceeding, except that it allows the subject to request an earlier hearing, and the order goes into
force thirty days after its issuance (unless it is appealed). Id. § 1818(e)(4).
Il l. See id § 1818(e)(3). The suspension order may be appealed within ten days of its
issuance. See id. § 1818(f).
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may suspend or remove the person if necessary to maintain public
confidence in the bank, and this action becomes final if the person is
convicted or pleads guilty to a related offense." 2
FIRREA's additions to this removal power were significant." 3 It
empowered a bank regulator to ban an individual who has been suspended
or removed from a bank from participating in the affairs of any other
financial institution or financial agency; in effect, the regulator could
impose an industry-wide bar on the individual.'14 In a related vein,
FDICIA gave bank regulators the power to take "prompt corrective
action[s]" with respect to undercapitalized institutions.1 5 In the case of
"significantly undercapitalized institutions" or "undercapitalized
institutions" that were failing to improve their capital position, these
actions included the power to dismiss officers or directors, to require an
election of a new board and the appointment of specified officers," 6 and
to restrict senior executives' compensation.'"7 FIRREA also enhanced civil
money penalties that could be levied against officers and directors, among
others," 8 and empowered the FDIC to pursue officers and directors for
claims assumed from a failed bank."9
112. Id. § 1818(g). Congress added this provision in 1966. See Garten, supra note 53, at 538.
The targeted officer or director can challenge the suspension or removal before the bank regulator
and appeal any final action to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(g)(3),
(h)(2) (2000).
113. See generally Michael P. Malloy, Nothing to Fear but FIRREA Itself: Revising and
Reshaping the Enforcement Process of Federal Bank Regulation, 50 OHIO ST. L. J. 1117, 1146-52
(1989) (discussing the "enhancement of administrative powers under FIRREA").
114. See 12 U.S.C.S. § 1818(e)(6),(7) (2006); see also McCoY, supra note 23, § 13.03[6][a].
Admittedly, the agency issuing the order could later consent to the removal of this prohibition. See
12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(7)(B) (2000) (demanding the written consent of the financial regulator
overseeing the institution that the disciplined party would like to join as an institution-affiliated
party).
115. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831(o).
116. See id. § 1831(o)(f)(2)(F).
117. See id. § 1831 (o)(f)(4). For a critically undercapitalized institution, a regulator can restrict
the payment of excessive executive compensation and bonuses. Id. § 183 l(i)(2)(F).
118. See id. § 1818(i)(2) (setting forth system of three tiers of civil money penalties). For
liabilities of directors of national banks for money damages, and for the three-tiers of penalties
associated with them, see id. § 93; for liabilities of directors and officers of state banks that are
members of the Federal Reserve System, see id. §§ 503-504. See also McCoY, supra note 23,
§§ 13.03[7], 13.04.
119. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (2000). Criminal violations for bank fraud were also
substantially increased beginning in 1984. See generally Michael A. Green, After the Fall: The
Criminal Law Enforcement Response to the S&L Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L. REv. (ANNUAL SURVEY
ISSUE) S155 (1991) (outlining increased penalties for, and prosecutions of banking crimes
following the S&L crisis of the 1980's).
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Available data show that bank regulators use these enforcement powers
against bank officers and directors. 2 ' In 2005, of the OCC's thirty-two
consensual removal orders, twelve involved senior bank officers (at the
level of president or CEO) or directors; the rest concerned lower-level
officers and bank employees, such as tellers.12' For 2005, of the ten cease-
and-desist orders targeting individuals rather than institutions, three
addressed senior bank officers (again, at the presidential level) and
directors. 122 For 2004 and 2003, the data was roughly similar.123 The FDIC
similarly disciplined officers and directors of state-chartered banks.124
120. The OCC website provides some records of enforcement actions against officers and
directors ofnational banks. See Legal & Regulatory, Enforcement Actions, http://www.occ.treas.gov/
EnforcementActions/ (last visited July 7, 2006) (providing a search engine for enforcement
actions). Moreover, the OCC highlights its enforcement actions against top bank officers and
directors. See, e.g., COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2004, supra
note 48, at 16-17.
121. To identify removals or suspensions, it is necessary to select Prohibition Orders from the
"lAP Actions" menu. See http://www.occ.treas.gov/EnforcementActions/. Non-consensual removal
orders are issued pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1829 (2000) for conviction of a crime involving
dishonesty. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ANNUAL REPORT: FIscAL YEAR 2005, supra
note 47, at 21 (listing 410 such removals in 2005). The OCC website lists these removals, but does
not provide the details, so that there is no way to determine from this site whether a removal
involves a director or senior officer. See http://www.occ.treas.gov/EnforcementActions/.
122. See http://www.occ.treas.gov/EnforcementActions/ (follow "Personal Cease and Desist
Orders" hyperlink under the "lAP Actions" menu; then follow "2005" hyperlink under the "Year"
menu; then follow "Search" hyperlink). The cease-and-desist order often demands affirmative
action from the disciplined party, such as avoiding the misbehavior in the future and disclosing the
past discipline to a financial institution if the person is ever asked to serve again as an institution
affiliated party. See, e.g., In re David A. Barrett, Former Chairman of the Board, Guaranty National
Bank, OCC No. 2005-66 (June 24, 2005) (requiring him not to provide legal services to financial
institutions in the future and, if he becomes an institution-affiliated party, to comply with laws and
institutional guidelines, and imposing $27,500 penalty).
123. In 2004, of the OCC's thirty-seven consensual removal orders, five involved senior bank
officers or directors. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. In 2003, eleven of the thirty-nine
consensual removals involved top officers or directors. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
For 2004, six of the fifteen cease-and-desist orders targeting individuals, rather than institutions,
addressed senior bank officers and directors. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. In 2003,
six of the twenty-one personal cease-and-desist orders reached bank officers and directors. See
supra note 47 and accompanying text.
124. The problem is that the available data for state-chartered banks does not always clearly
identify the position of the individual being disciplined in consensual removal or cease-and-desist
actions. Enforcement actions against state insured banks that are not members of the Federal
Reserve System are accessible through the website of the FDIC. See FDIC Enforcement Decisions
and Orders, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/enforcement/index.html (last visited May 20,
2006). That search engine leads to details on the position of the disciplined individual only when
the action is contested and subject to an FDIC judgment. See, e.g., In re Roque De La Fuente II,
First International Bank, Docket No. FDIC-97-3 1 e (Feb. 17,2004) (imposing removal and industry
ban on officer and director after lengthy proceedings), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/
individual/enforcement/5278.html. Indeed, the FDIC's proceedings relating to De La Fuente
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Although criminal actions against bank officers and directors are
handled by the Department of Justice and U.S. attorneys instead of by
bank regulators, and although this is a complex area of the law, it is
important to mention these actions in reference to the enforcement of
standards of conduct for bank management. Just as civil enforcement
powers increased for bank regulators as a result of the failures of banks
and other financial institutions in the 1980s, federal prosecutors
increasingly prosecuted bank officers and directors. The FBI activated a
Financial Institutions Fraud Unit, which, at the beginning, concentrated on
fraud by bank insiders. 2 ' Moreover, FIRREA increased the maximum
penalty for numerous bank-related crimes from a five-year imprisonment
and fines ranging from $1,000 to $10,000 to a twenty-year imprisonment
exemplify the circumstances when regulators seek a lifelong ban of an individual from the financial
services industry. A director of a bank, De La Fuente essentially used it to make numerous loans
to firms controlled by him, in violation of restrictions on insider loans. See Roque De La Fuente
11 v. FDIC, 332 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that FDIC properly found that De La Fuente had
violated Regulation 0 (restricting insider loans), but remanding case to FDIC regarding propriety
of Section 23A violation (affiliate loans) and proper aspect of lifetime ban). In the FDIC proceeding
of February 2004, the FDIC concluded that the lifetime ban was proper solely in light of the
Regulation 0 violations and in order to protect the public and to punish De La Fuente. See In re
Rogue De La Fuente II, First International Bank, Docket No. FDIC-97-31e (Feb. 17, 2004)
(imposing removal and an industry ban on the officer and director following a lengthy proceeding),
available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/enforcement/5278.html. By contrast, the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System's web site provides enforcement action information
with respect to state-chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System, bank holding
companies and branches and agencies of foreign banking organizations and their parent
banks, among others. See List of Enforcement Actions, http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
enforcement/search.cfin (last visited May 20, 2006). There were only two of twelve removal
actions involving a top executive or director in 2005. See id. In 2004, there were two removal
actions addressing exclusively a top executive or director. See id. In 2003, there was a notice of
charges seeking a prohibition order against Jean Peyrelevade, former Chairman and CEO of Crddit
Lyonnais, a defunct French bank, for a complex proceeding involving that foreign bank's
disguising its acquisition of a U.S. insurance company. See In re Jean Peyrelevade, Federal Reserve
Docket Nos. 03-041-CMP-I, 03-041-B-I, 03-041-E-I (Dec. 18, 2003) available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/PRESS/Enforcement/2003/20031218/attachme
nt3.pdf. Federal Reserve Board enforcement actions also sometimes seek to improve the
performance of particular officers and directors of an institution, as well as to improve the
performance of the institution's entire management. See, e.g., Written Agreement between
Ridgedale State Bank and Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Federal Reserve Docket No. 03-
024-WA/RB-SM (July 29, 2003) (requiring the board, among other things, to conduct an outside
review of its management and, on the basis of that review, to take action to improve that
management), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/enforcement/2003/
20030902/attachment 1 .pdf.
125. KErTH SLOTrER, FIN. INST. CRIME UNIT, CHECK FRAUD: A SOPHISTICATED CRIMINAL
ENTERPRISE (1996), http://www.fbi.gov.publications/leb/1996/aug961.txt. See http://www.fbi.gov/
hq/cid/fc/fifiu/fifu.htm. The unit explains that insider abuse has declined, to be replaced by financial
fraud coming from outside the institution. See id.
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and a $1,000,000 fine.'26 The 1990 Crime Control Act'2 7 increased the
maximum penalties even further, to a thirty-year imprisonment.' These
acts, among other things, directed the U.S. Sentencing Commission to
establish guidelines that would increase the sentences for these crimes,'29
authorized forfeiture of the proceeds of banking crimes,'a and created new
banking crimes particularly aimed at insiders.' 3'
Certainly, the power of bank regulators to monitor and discipline bank
management is extensive and, in some cases, draconian. No officer or
director can wish to be banned for life from the banking industry (unless
the alternative is prison). Yet this discipline is part of the nature of the
bank officer and director position and the regulatory oversight of it. Upon
becoming an officer or director, an individual has been alerted that he or
she will occupy a position subject to considerable government oversight. 13 2
Monitoring by bank regulators, particularly through bank examinations,
reinforces this message, as well as constantly alerts him or her to bank
regulatory expectations about behavior and to specific concerns about his
or her performance of duties. If, then, the applicable bank regulator
disciplines the officer or director or refers the matter to a federal
prosecutor, generally the targeted party would have little ground for
asserting that he or she was never warned about the importance of the
position and the penalties for breaching its duties.
126. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Congressional Re-election Through Symbolic Politics: The
Enhanced Banking Crime Penalties, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 3, 13 n.80 (1994). Fitzpatrick
discusses how FIRREA raised the maximum penalties for the ten primary financial institution
offenses and statutes from two-to-five to twenty years, criminalized a financial institution insider's
obstruction of justice, extended criminal liability to "institution-affiliated" parties who violate
agency prohibition or removal orders, made bank fraud a predicate offense under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and extended the statute of limitations for the
principal banking crimes from five to ten years. See id. at 13-14. He refers to increased penalties
for bank bribery, see 18 U.S.C. § 215 (2000), misapplication of funds, see id. §§ 656, 657, false
entries, see id. §§ 1005, 1006, the submission of false documents to the FDIC, see id. § 1007, the
making of false statements in connection with a loan or credit application, see id. § 1014, and bank
fraud, see id. § 1344. See Fitzpatrick, supra, at 13 n.80.
127. Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 2504(b), 104 Stat. 4789 (1990).
128. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 126, at 14-15.
129. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 994 (2003).
130. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 982(a)(2) (2002).
131. See 18 U.S.C. § 1510(b) (2000) (criminalizing a bank officer or director's revealing the
receipt of a subpoena or its contents to a bank customer, by way of FIRREA); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1032
(2002) (criminalizing knowing concealment of assets from a bank receiver or conservator, by way
of the Crime Control Act); 18 U.S.C. § 1517 (2000) (criminalizing obstructing a bank examiner,
by way of the Crime Control Act); id. § 225 (criminalizing operating a continuing financial crimes
enterprise through the Crime Control Act).
132. See supra Part II.A.
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HI. PATERNALISTIC REGULATION OF PUBLIC
COMPANY MANAGEMENT
The picture of regulation of bank management that emerges from the
preceding Part is one of all-encompassing oversight. Bank directors and
officers are screened and preapproved by bank regulators who set
standards for their conduct and monitor them on an ongoing basis. Bank
regulators (and federal prosecutors) have considerable power to enforce
compliance with these standards.
By contrast, the SEC's regulation of management of public companies
is quite different. This Part first provides a brief overview of the
regulation. Historically the SEC's regulation of management through the
federal securities laws was indirect because it was based on disclosure:
The SEC required companies to disclose information about their officers
and directors, which indirectly affected the background of these persons
and their behavior. The Part next argues that Sarbanes-Oxley brought into
the open a different kind of SEC regulation of public company
management that has been growing over the past twenty years and is more
akin to bank regulation. But the development of this regulation has been
one-sided. The SEC has gained considerable enforcement powers over
officers and directors in public companies, but has no comparable power
to screen them, and only a limited role in setting their standards of
conduct. The Part concludes by explaining the reasons for this outcome,
which is due mainly to Congress's and the SEC's reactions to corporate
scandals and to the SEC's institutional limitations.
A. The One-Sided Growth of SEC Paternalistic Regulation
Historically, in stark contrast to bank management, officers and
directors of a typical public company were subject to little substantive
regulatory oversight. Shareholders have the power to elect board members,
who in turn appoint the senior officers. '33 There are no qualifications under
corporate law for public company officers and directors other than that
they be natural persons.'34 The selection of and standards for officers and
directors are essentially industry and market issues designed to identify the
133. The Model Business Corporation Act reflects the development of corporate law
jurisprudence and is often a model for the corporate law in many States. See MODEL Bus. CORP.
ACT §§ 8.03(c), 8.40(b) (2004) [hereinafter MBCA]. See also FRANKLIN A. GEVURTz, CORP. LAW
179 (2000).
134. See MBCA § 8.02 & commentary, § 8.03(a), § 8.40(b). Historically, there were
qualifications for directors, but even they generally required only that directors be shareholders. See
GEVURTZ, supra note 133, at 186. Under the internal affairs doctrine, under which the governance
of a corporation is dictated by state corporate law, any such standards are part of this law. See
GEVURTZ, supra note 133, at 35-39.
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individuals with the necessary industry and professional management
training and competence.13 ' Standards of conduct for directors and officers
have also been primarily a market issue. State law provides general
guidelines for behavior of officers through agency law'36 and for directors
through fiduciary duty standards of care and loyalty (which also have
agency law origins) under corporate law.'37 Since the early days when
obtaining a corporate charter required a special grant from a legislature,138
outside of a regulated industry, no governmental body or agency (like bank
regulators) screens the entry of individuals into the positions of public
officer and director or monitors their performance.
The federal securities laws in no way empower the SEC, unlike bank
regulators, to preapprove officers and directors for service in public
companies. Rather, they only indirectly affect the composition of public
company officers and directors by requiring a firm to disclose information
about its management when it enters, and remains in, the public markets.'39
This information is extensive and could uncover embarrassing information
about the officer or director. 4' Disclosure of this information, like all
SEC-based disclosure, is supposed to have a "sunshine" effect; in this
case, it should discourage inappropriate people from assuming officer and
director positions because, the reasoning goes, investors will be unwilling
135. Historically, the main question for company management, and particularly company
executives, was whether the executives had the training and expertise to operate the large national
firms (such as the railroads) that became publicly held. See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR.,
THE VISIBLE HAND 130-33 (1977).
136. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 Bus.
LAW. 439 (2005) (emphasizing the agency law foundation of standards of conduct for officers).
137. See MBCA § 8.30 & Official Comment.
138. See GEVURTZ, supra note 133, at 20-21.
139. See infra notes 140, 142 and accompanying text.
140. Historically, the disclosure about officers and directors dealt with their identity, their
securities holdings, their compensation and their transactions with the company. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 77aa, Schedule A(4), (7), (14), (22) and (24) (2000). It has grown considerably over the years.
See 17 C.F.R. § 229.401 (a)-(d) (2005) (requiring an identification of all directors and executives
officers, including their positions and ages, as well as any arrangement or contract pursuant to
which he or she was selected, and any family relationships with other officers and directors). The
company must describe the business experience of the officer or director for the past five years, and
any other director positions held in another public company or registered investment company. See
17 C.F.R. § 229.401 (e) (2005); see also 17 C.F.R. § 229.401 (f) (2005) (requiring disclosure of the
involvement of a named officer or director in any of specified kinds of legal proceedings). This
means that officers and directors must answer detailed questionnaires about themselves for the
company at the time of its becoming public, and on a regular basis thereafter. When a company is
going public, this kind of information is included in the registration statement on Form S-1. Once
a company is public, this kind of disclosure is included in annual filings under the Exchange Act,
see Form 10-K, Items 10-13, which are incorporated by reference in the company's registration
statements for future offerings on Form S-3.
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to invest in a company directed and managed by them.' 41
The federal securities laws and SEC regulations do impose a few
standards of conduct on officers and directors of public companies, as well
as sanctions for the failure to follow them. As is well known, the standards
primarily focus on ensuring the material accuracy of the company's
disclosure and the officer's and director's trading in the company's
securities. Officers and directors must ensure that their company, when it
raises capital from the public and while it remains a public firm, complies
with the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws concerning
the company's business and financial results, as well as other information
deemed by Congress and the SEC to be material to investors.'42 The
officers and directors also have to follow standards restricting their short-
term trading and insider trading in their company's securities. 43
Over the years, the standards of conduct imposed upon a public
company director and officer by the federal securities laws and SEC rules
have increased, yet these standards generally have been disclosure-based
as well. Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act that amended the
Exchange Act, for example, a public company has to establish internal
accounting controls that would allow it to prepare accurate financial
statements, and this is management's responsibility.'" Additional
141. In reality, if the SEC is concerned about the quality of the executives and directors of a
company doing a public offering, it has statutory powers pursuant to which it can delay or impede
an offering, such as a refusal order and a stop order. See 15 U.S.C. § 77h (2000).
142. When a company goes public, it must file a registration statement that contains the
prospectus or main selling document. The senior officers and all directors are liable for any material
omission or misrepresentation of a material fact in the registration statement. See 15 U.S.C.§ 77k(a)
(2000) (reaching all directors and those who sign the registration statement, who must be the
principal executive officer or officers, the principal financial officer, the controller or principal
accounting officer and of a majority of the board of directors). Once public, a company must file
periodic disclosure reports with the SEC, the main one of which (the Form 10-K) must be signed
by the principal executive and financial officers and the majority of the board. Liability attaches
to such persons for material misrepresentations or omissions in the reports. See id. § 78r(a). There
is also potential liability under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, see id. § 78j(b), and Rule lOb-5,
see 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005), for these misrepresentations and omissions.
143. To summarize baldly a complex legal area, the federal securities laws regulate trading
in the company's equity securities by company officers and directors in two ways: (i) through the
disclosure and short-swing penalties of Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, see 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 78p (2002), and (ii) through the prohibition on insider trading under Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j (2000), and Rule 1Ob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005).
144. See Pub. L. No. 95-213, title I, § 102, 91 Stat. 1494 (Dec. 19, 1977) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) & (3)). Another celebrated example involved disclosure about executive
compensation. In 1992, the SEC tried to rein in the amount of this compensation, but it could do
so only indirectly by requiring a company to disclose, among other things, the relationship of the
compensation to a company's financial performance. See Executive Compensation Disclosure,
Securities Act Release No. 6940, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,003
(proposing provisions that would require a report by the Board Compensation Committee on the
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standards also came from stock exchange rules. 145 At about the same time
as the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, for instance, the
NYSE required its listed companies to have an audit committee composed
only of independent directors, which indirectly affected the composition
of public company boards."4
SEC regulation of public company officers and directors has grown
exponentially on the "back end" of enforcement, but without any SEC
monitoring of the officers and directors. As the standard securities law
treatise remarks, the SEC's enforcement powers are "awesome.' 47 In
1989, as a reaction to an earlier wave of scandals in public companies, the
SEC sought to increase its enforcement powers against officers and
directors of public companies. The culmination of this effort was the
Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990
(Remedies Act), 4 ' which gave the SEC the power (similar to that of bank
regulators) to seek from a court a temporary suspension or permanent bar
against an officer or director of a public company from serving in a similar
capacity in the future if the person's conduct "demonstrate[s] substantial
unfitness to serve as an officer or director" of any issuer."'
The Remedies Act also gave to the SEC several powers that are in the
arsenal of bank regulators. Under the power to issue cease-and-desist
orders through administrative proceedings, which is in addition to the
longstanding SEC enforcement power to seek a court injunction to
bases for its compensation decisions with respect to the Chief Executive Officer and the other
named executive officers, and the relationship of such compensation to company performance)
(June 23, 1992); No. 6962, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,056 (Oct. 16,
1992). See generally 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2004) (covering standards of executive compensation
disclosure). Disclosure about executive compensation is currently the subject of SEC rule-making.
See Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 6542 (proposed Feb. 8,
2006).
145. Under federal securities law, these internal accounting controls must be pre-approved by
the SEC. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (2000).
146. See Exchange Act. Release No. 13,346, 11 SEC Docket 1945 (1977).
147. See Louts Loss & JOEL SELiGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1420
(2001) ("The SEC's enforcement arsenal is now awesome.").
148. Pub. L. No. 101-429, title II, § 201 (Oct. 15, 1990), 104 Stat. 935.
149. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77t(e) (2002); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(2)(2002). See Ralph C. Ferrara
et al., Hardball! The SEC"s New Arsenal of Enforcement Weapons, 47 Bus. LAw. 33, 33-41 (1991)
(describing at length the new enforcement powers, including the power to bring cease-and-desist
proceedings before an administrative law judge, rather than seek an injunction before a court,
against any party, and this power was modeled on the banking agencies). See generally Jayne W.
Barnard, SEC Debarment of Officers and Directors After Sarbanes-Oxley, 59 Bus. LAW. 391
(2004) (noting that the SEC debarment power came about as a result of the Remedies Act following
upon a recommendation of the Treadway Commission in 1987). Courts interpreted this provision
to require egregious misbehavior on the officer or director's part and a likelihood of future
misconduct. See id. at 396-401; see also, e.g., SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 141-42 (2d Cir. 1995).
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discipline, among others, officers and directors of public companies, ° the
SEC is empowered to compel a party both to refrain from taking an action
and to take a specified action.1 5' The Remedies Act also empowered the
SEC to have a court impose three tiers of civil money penalties-again
like those in the banking law statutes-and allowed them to be used for,
among other things, violations of a cease-and-desist order." 2
B. The Advance of Paternalistic Regulation in Sarbanes-Oxley
It is not surprising that Sarbanes-Oxley significantly advanced SEC
paternalistic regulation of public company officers and directors, for it was
an acute congressional reaction to a perception of widespread scandals
involving those executives. 3 Sarbanes-Oxley contributed to three types
of this regulation: gatekeeping, setting standards of conduct, and
monitoring and enforcement. Although it did not empower the SEC to
screen public firm officers and directors, Sarbanes-Oxley mandated
eligibility criteria for some public company directors. '54 More importantly,
it significantly intruded upon state corporate law by setting certain
standards of conduct for officers and directors.ss In further empowering
the SEC and federal prosecutors to enforce adherence to the standards,
Sarbanes-Oxley clearly took a page from the bank regulatory book.
The gatekeeping aspect of Sarbanes-Oxley is indirect insofar as it
imposes qualifications applicable to only some directors of a public
150. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77t(b) (2002) (power to seek injunctions in federal court in Securities
Act); id. § 78u(d)(l) (power to seek injunctions in federal court in Exchange Act); id. § 78o(c)(4)
(giving SEC administrative power to compel a person to correct a report not in compliance with
the law and SEC rules).
151. See id. § 77h-l(a); id. § 78u-3(a). As in the case of the similar power held by bank
regulators, the SEC may also seek a temporary cease-and-desist order, although only against
securities professionals, not public company officers and directors. See id. § 77h-1(c)(2).
152. See id. § 77t(d); id. § 78u(d)(3). The money penalties range, for a natural person, from
$5,000, $50,000 to $100,000, or, in each case, the gross amount of the pecuniary gain, if it is
greater. See id. § 78u(d)(3)(B). The SEC can impose money penalties administratively only on
regulated persons, such as brokers. See id. § 77h-1 (c)(2). It must ask a court to impose them against
an officer or director of a public company. See id.
153. The perception reflected reality. Existing evidence suggests that in the late 1990s and
early 2000s a significant number of companies engaged in questionable accounting practices that
were known or designed by senior management. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL
STATEMENT RESTATEMENTS: TRENDS, MARKET IMPACTS, REGULATORY RESPONSES, AND
REMAINING CHALLENGES, GAO-03-138, at 4-9 (2002) (summarizing data on the increase in
financial restatements in period 1997-2001). See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
FINANCIAL STATEMENT RESTATEMENT DATABASE, GAO-03-395R (2003) (providing data about
restatements from individual companies).
154. See Sarbanes-Oxley, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 301, 403, 116 Stat. 745, 775-77, 787-90.
155. See id. §§ 403,406-07.
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company.'56 Since in the corporate scandals misleading financial
statements disguised the real financial condition of the companies and the
self-interested transactions by their executives, the basic thrust of
Sarbanes-Oxley was to improve financial disclosure. As is well known, it
enhanced the role of the board audit committee, which is responsible for
overseeing a firm's preparation of financial statements and its financial
disclosure. One reform with a gatekeeping import is the requirement that
all members of a board audit committee be independent, with
independence defined to ensure that a board member will have no financial
or other connection to the company. 57 This reform was not new, because
an independent audit committee had been a NYSE listing requirement for
years and was a recommended and accepted best practice for public
firms. 58 However, the new statutory requirement had a ripple regulatory
effect by emphasizing the importance of and criteria for independence of
a board member in other contexts.159 Moreover, both the NYSE and the
156. See id.
157. Sarbanes-Oxley does this by prohibiting stock exchanges from listing the security of any
company that does not have an audit committee formed and functioning in accordance with its
standards. See Sarbanes-Oxley § 301, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (m) (2002). The SEC implemented § 301
by its rule-making, which shaped the stock exchange rules. See Standards Related to Listed
Company Audit Committees, Securities Act Release No. 8220,68 Fed. Reg. 18,788 (Apr. 16, 2003)
(setting forward final Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1 OA-3); Securities Act Release No. 8173, 68 Fed. Reg.
2638 (Jan. 17, 2003) (proposed rule). Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC attempted to enhance the
quality of audit committees by, among other things, imposing independence requirements upon the
audit committee and requiring it to have a charter and its members to be financially literate. See
Audit Committee Disclosure, Exchange Act Rel. No. 42,266, 64 Fed. Reg. 73,389 (Dec. 30, 1999);
see also, e.g., Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by the
NYSE, Inc., Amending the Exchange's Audit Committee Requirements and Notice of Filing and
Order Granting Accelerated Approval ofAmendments No. I and No. 2 Thereto, Exchange Act Rel.
No. 42,233, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,529 (Dec. 21, 1999). 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-l(m)(3) (2002) sets forward
the statutory standards of independence. The NYSE requires that a listed company have an audit
committee that satisfies these statutory standards, see NYSE, Inc., Listed Company
Manual [hereinafter NYSE] § 303.A06 (2005), available at http://www.nyse.com/listed/
1022221393251 .html, and its rules then explain that the standards demand that audit committee
members be independent, in accordance with the general NYSE definition of independence. See
NYSE, § 303.A07(b). The NASD follows a similar approach for the Nasdaq Stock Market. See
NASD, Inc., Marketplace Rules [hereinafter NASD] § 4350(d)(2) (2005), available at
http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/index.html (adding that a committee member must not have
participated in the preparation of the financial statements of the company or any current subsidiary
at any time during the past three years).
158. See, e.g., In re New York Stock Exhange, Exchange Act Release No. 13,346, 11 SEC
Docket 1945 (Mar. 9, 1977) (illustrating that the NYSE had in fact recommended that a company
have a board audit committee since 1940).
159. The NYSE extended the independence requirement to the two other major board
committees, the nominating/corporate governance committee (which nominates individuals for
board membership and oversees a firm's corporate governance), see NYSE, § 303A.04(a), and the
compensation committee (which sets executive compensation), see NYSE, § 303A.05(a). Under
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NASD amended their listing rules to require that the board of a listed
company have a majority of independent directors, and defined
independence more strictly than before. 6  Even more relevant from the
indirect gatekeeping perspective, Sarbanes-Oxley required a public
company to have a director who is a "financial expert" on its board audit
committee (in essence, someone qualified to detect financial machinations
by executives) or to disclose the reason for the absence of this expert, and
the SEC and the stock exchanges reinforced this requirement through their
regulations.161
That Sarbanes-Oxley established standards of conduct for public
company officers and directors is more significant, and controversial, than
its indirect gatekeeping effect. 62 A detailed review of those standards is
beyond the scope of this Article, but a few examples make the point. For
senior executives, the standards actually have punitive, enforcement-
oriented importance. One of the best known Sarbanes-Oxley reforms is its
requirement that a CEO and a CFO, or respective equivalents, certify the
material accuracy of the firm's public disclosure and financial statements
in a firm's quarterly and annual reports.1 63 The requirement is intended to
NASD, § 4350(c)(4)(A), board nominations generally can be done by a majority of the independent
directors on the board or a nominating committee of independent board members. On the
independence of the compensation committee, see NASD, § 4350(c)(3) (allowing, but not
requiring, a compensation committee composed of independent directors, to determine executive
compensation; this committee's tasks can be performed by a majority of the independent directors).
The SEC indirectly compels companies to have a nominating/corporate governance committee
through its disclosure rules by requiring disclosure of whether a company has such a committee,
the identification of its members, the number of its meetings, and its functions. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-101 Item 7(d)(1) (2005); see also Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee
Functions and Communications Between Security Holders and Boards ofDirectors, Exchange Act
Release No. 48,825, 68 Fed. Reg. 66,992 (Nov. 28, 2003).
160. See NYSE, § 303A.01; NASD, § 4350(c)(1).
161. See Sarbanes-Oxley § 407, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7265 (2002). The SEC implemented the statute
by rule, under which a company must disclose in its annual report the identity of the financial
expert (or why the audit committee has no such expert), who has certain attributes related to the
statutory factors. See Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Securities Act Release No. 8177, 68 Fed. Reg. 5110, 5111 (Jan. 31, 2003) (final rule);
Securities Act Release No. 8138, 67 Fed. Reg. 66,208 (Oct 30, 2002) (proposed rule); 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.401(h)(2) (2005). For the stock exchange requirements, see NYSE, § 303.A07(a); NASD,
§ 4350(d)(2)(A). The exchanges went further in this regard by mandating that all audit committee
members be (or become) financially literate. See NYSE, § 303.A07(a) & Commentary; NASD,
§ 4350(d)(2)(A).
162. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-OxleyAct and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L. J. 1521, 1568-85 (2005) (arguing that the provisions dealing with
standards of conduct were added irresponsibly by Congress under pressure from corporate
governance entrepreneurs with no cost/benefit analysis).
163. See Sarbanes-Oxley § 302, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7241 (2002) (setting out certification
responsibilities); Sarbanes-Oxley § 906, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (2002) (subjecting executives to
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prevent executives from ordering their subordinates to prepare misleading
disclosures and statements and then laying the blame on these
subordinates. The requirement also imposes minimum standards of officer
behavior with respect to establishing and monitoring a firm's system of
controls for recording transactions and representing the firm's
performance."6 Another example is the restriction on executives
borrowing money from their firms to prevent them from taking excessive
loans from their companies, as happened in WorldCom.
165
Sarbanes-Oxley's imposition of standards of conduct on public
company directors was designed less to be punitive and more to enhance
the board's monitoring of executives. These standards made inroads into
firm corporate governance, although in an expected way since for the most
part they codified existing market practice. An example suffices. Sarbanes-
Oxley articulated the minimum responsibilities of a board audit
committee, specifying that it, and not senior executives, is responsible for
appointing and supervising the independent accounting firm, for receiving
complaints about financial matters (including anonymous ones from
employees), and for selecting its own advisors. 166 The stock exchanges,
criminal penalties for false certifications). The SEC promulgated Exchange Act Rules 13a- 14 (17
C.F.R. § 240.13a- 14 (2005) and 15d-14 (17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-14 (2005)) for companies to follow
in making the certification. See Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual
Results, Securities Act Release 8124, 67 Fed. Reg. 57,276 (Sept. 9, 2002) (final rule); Exchange
Act Release No. 46,300, 67 Fed. Reg. 51,508 (Aug. 8, 2002) (revising proposed rule); Exchange
Act Release No. 46,079,67 Fed. Reg. 41,877 (June 14,2002) (proposed rule offered before passage
of Sarbanes-Oxley, made because investors were losing confidence that executives are paying
attention to company disclosure); see also Management's Report on Internal Control Over Financial
Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Filings, Securities Act Release
No. 8238, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636 (June 5, 2003) (final rule under which managers of a public
company must report on and certify internal control systems in their company).
164. This subject refers to internal controls for financial information and controls dealing with
non-financial information in the firm, ensuring accurate disclosure to the securities markets. On
internal controls, see 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(b)(2) (2002) (addition made by the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act). There is a parallel requirement of management responsibility for internal controls
in the banking statutes. See supra note 64.
165. See Enhanced Conflict of Interest Provisions, Sarbanes-Oxley § 402, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 78m(k) (2002). WorldCom's Ebbers seems to have been the source of this prohibition. See
DENNIS R. BEVESFORD, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF WORLDCOM, INC. (Mar. 31, 2003), available at
http://files.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/worldconm/bdspcomm6903rpt.pdfat 323-
27. In effect, WorldCom assumed loans of $5 billion made to Ebbers by various financial
institutions. Id. There is no SEC rule-making on this subject. Id. The restriction exactly parallels
the kind of restriction under banking laws on bank loans to bank officers. See COMPTROLLER OF
THE CURRENCY, THE DIRECTOR'S BOOK, supra note 21, at 85-87.
166. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (2004); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b)(2), (3), (4) & (5)
(2005). Again, the comparison with banking regulation is striking because banking law reforms in
the 1990s also enhanced the standards of conduct for bank audit committees. See supra note 65.
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with SEC approval, added other tasks for this committee, including the
review of the adequacy of internal controls and the review of a firm's risk
management policies.'67
The most significant contribution of Sarbanes-Oxley to the regulation
of public company management is in its enforcement of standards of
conduct for officers and directors, which is particularly punitive and akin
to the enforcement powers of bank regulators and federal prosecutors as
to bank management. Criminal and civil penalties are specifically tied to
some of the new officer and director duties. Misleading certification by a
CEO or a CFO can result in a fine ranging from one to five million dollars
or imprisonment of ten to twenty years, depending upon whether the
violation is knowing or willful. 6 Sarbanes-Oxley requires that a board
audit committee have a reporting channel for whistleblowers and an officer
or director who retaliates against a whistleblower may be subject both to
civil and criminal action.'69 Other provisions punish specific officer and
director misbehavior exhibited in the scandals: A CEO or a CFO must
return any bonus, equity-based compensation, or profits received on his or
her sale of securities during the twelve-month period following any
accounting restatement, due to failure of the company to comply with
financial reporting requirements. 7 ' In a similar vein, the SEC is
empowered to seek a temporary order freezing an "extraordinary payment"
from a public company to an officer or director. 7'
Sarbanes-Oxley's addition of the officer and director bar to SEC
enforcement powers is directly comparable to the power of bank
regulators. As noted above, this sanction was in existence prior to
Sarbanes-Oxley, but only a court could impose it and only then upon
finding the officer or director substantially unfit for service in a public
167. See NYSE, § 303A.07(c); NASD, § 4350(d)(3).
168. See Sarbanes-Oxley § 906, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1350(c) (2002).
169. See Sarbanes-Oxley § 1107, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1513(e) (2002) (providing for criminal
imprisonment of up to 10 years); Sarbanes-Oxley § 806, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A (2002) (giving
whistleblower employees a cause of action for reinstatement or damages and costs as a result of
demotion, firing, and harassment due to whistleblowing). For other behavior criminalized by
Sarbanes-Oxley, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1519 (2002) (knowingly to destroy, alter orcover up documents
to impede a federal investigation); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(c) (2002) (amending a federal obstruction
of justice statute so that it reaches corrupt destruction or alteration of documents to be used in an
official proceeding); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1348 (2002) (new crime of securities fraud); 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1349 (2002) (new crime of attempt and conspiracy to commit securities fraud).
170. See Sarbanes-Oxley § 304, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7243 (2002).
171. See Sarbanes-Oxley § 1103, 15 U.S.C.A. 78u-3(c)(3)(A)(i) (2002); see also SEC v.
Gemstar TV Guide Int'l, Inc., 367 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir.) (holding that the provision requires
the SEC to show what is an ordinary payment so as to determine that a particular payment is
extraordinary), vacateden banc, 384 F.3d 1090, 1090 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 401 F.3d 1031, 1046-
47 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that no SEC showing of what constitutes ordinary payment is required).
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company.'72 Sarbanes-Oxley made two important changes to the bar
power. First, it amended the standard for a court's imposition of a
suspension or bar against a director or officer from "substantial unfitness"
to simply "unfitness.""' Second, and even more significantly, Sarbanes-
Oxley added the power to seek the officer and director bar in
administrative proceedings, rather than only in judicial proceedings, to the
SEC's arsenal, applying the same "unfitness" standard.'74 Thus, like bank
regulators, the SEC can now impose a lifetime, industry bar on an officer
and director of a public company through an administrative proceeding, a
penalty likely to receive considerable deference from a court.'75
C. Psychological Explanations for the Increased
Paternalism of SEC Regulation of Management
What explains the SEC's increasingly paternalistic and enforcement
oriented regulation of public company directors and officers? The
enforcement focus of SEC regulation arises from basic human
psychological tendencies or predilections. Studies indicate that individuals
have a major tendency to attribute effects in complex organizations and
social settings to the actions and personalities of a few key individuals,
who are perceived to represent the entire organization.'76 Human beings
are predisposed to believe that the decisions and actions of other
individuals are responsible for most social outcomes, such as the failure
172. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
173. See Sarbanes-Oxley§ 305 (amending 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78u(d)(2), 77t(e) (2002)); Barnard,
SEC Debarment, supra note 149, at 409-19 (noting that the question is left open as to whether
cease-and-desist bans require a lower showing of potential future misconduct by the SEC (requiring
only a "risk," rather than a reasonable likelihood of future violations)).
174. See Sarbanes-Oxley § 1105 (amending 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78u-3, 77h-1 (2002)).
175. See Jayne W. Barnard, The SEC's Suspension and Bar Powers in Perspective, 76 TUL.
L. REV. 1253, 1268 (2002) (discussing why the SEC wanted to add suspension and bar powers to
its existing cease-and-desist powers); see also Barnard, SECDebarment, supra note 149, at405-07
(arguing that the SEC wanted unfettered discretion to impose a lifetime bar on directors and officers
(even if this power interferes with state corporate law)).
176. This is a case of what psychologists call the bias of the "fundamental attribution error."
See generally ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 169-94 (2nd ed. 1986) (explaining how
observers incorrectly attribute internal change to the actors involved). The assumption in this
discussion is that, despite their efforts to act rationally, individuals suffer cognitive limitations
because their decision-making is adversely affected by unconscious biases and employs decision
models inappropriate for complex reasoning tasks. The literature on these limitations, which call
into question the model of individuals as rational decision-makers, is voluminous. See generally
CASS SUNSTEIN, ED., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (2000) (collection of essays applying
insights of behavioral studies to the analysis of law and policy); Symposium, The Legal
Implications of Psychology: Human Behavior, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 1497 (1998) (expounding on the weakness of the application of the rational choice model to
economic theory).
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of a company or the declaration of a war. 17 7 Another well-documented
psychological phenomenon is the tendency of individuals to become
overly concerned about a problem that is presented vividly to them and is
constantly brought to their attention (in psychological terms, it is "salient"
or "available"). This phenomenon occurs even if, as a statistical matter, the
problem is not significant in comparison to other perceived risks and
dangers. 178 For example, people commonly experience a fear of flying after
a well-publicized airplane crash, often resulting in a decision to drive to
their destinations instead, even though automobile travel is statistically
more dangerous than airplane travel. 179 This way of thinking generally
exposes a failure to rationally weigh the benefits of recognizing the
"vivid" problem (which might be small) with the costs of the reaction or
regulation (which might be large).
Taken together, these psychological tendencies may explain both the
congressional and SEC focus on punishing public company directors and
officers. Once a corporate scandal is revealed, it seems that the firm is not
as it appeared to be. As the firm loses business and goes bankrupt, the
market for its stock plummets, with a great loss of value to shareholders,
creditors, and eventually, to employees. The business media highlight the
loss and attribute it to senior executives in the firm, parroting the tendency
of editors and reporters to look for the responsible individuals. In turn,
viewers, listeners, and readers find this assessment convincing. The
publicity, in turn, generates public outrage and leads people to believe that
the scandal and others like it reveal a significant general problem in firms
that needs to be immediately addressed in order to prevent more losses. In
response to media and public pressure, companies jettison the targeted
executives, who are now ironically painted as villains, despite being
celebrated as business heroes a few months before. This same
psychologically-oriented focus on the individual in the immediate wake of
the scandals leads Congress, the SEC, and federal prosecutors to take
action by punishing executives and directors, often by congressional
proceeding, agency enforcement action, or criminal prosecution. Officials
may also take action through punitive prospective measures with respect
to public company management, incorporating legislation, regulations, and
task forces. The measures include additional enforcement powers for the
SEC, new categories of crimes specifically aimed at directors and officers,
and the imposition of strict, almost punitive, standards of conduct on them.
177. See SCOTT PLous, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 180-85
(1993).
178. This is referred to as the availability heuristic. See generally JONATHAN BARON,
THINKING AND DECIDING 210-13 (1st ed. 1988).
179. See Stan Finger, Yes, Storms Kill... but so can your Tub, WICHITA EAGLE, Jan. 19,
2005. at IA.
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This psychological theory certainly explains Sarbanes-Oxley as a reaction
to the scandals in Enron and WorldCom,'80 and to preceding enforcement-
oriented securities legislation.
This psychological explanation of increased paternalism in public
company management complements other accounts of the growth of
enforcement regulation generally based on a model of rational human
behavior. For example, Professor Roberta Romano opines that members
of Congress legislated Sarbanes-Oxley in reaction to public concerns about
corporate scandals, fearing they would be voted out of office if they did
nothing.18' In her view, the interest groups and political entrepreneurs
favoring increased government regulation of business and corporate
management took advantage of the political climate to lobby Congress to
pass laws implementing regulation in line with their views.182 From a
related perspective, the addition to the U.S. criminal code of new crimes
targeting public company directors and executives can be viewed as
symbolic action by Congress. Thus, Congress does something in reaction
to the scandals, even if the newly-created crimes will have little effect
since they merely duplicate existing crimes, such as mail and wire fraud. '83
In light of these revisions, business and corporate interests acted rationally
in not opposing the increase in criminal liability, because they could see
that additional crimes did little to change the legal risks for directors and
officers. A psychological explanation would add to these accounts the
view that the psychological tendencies drive, or at least add their force to,
the political and self-interested motivations of the actors involved.
Members of Congress, regulators, and prosecutors are not simply
calculating machines, manipulating situations only to serve themselves;
they, too, see corporate scandals as vivid events, caused primarily by
individuals and in great need of regulation.
180. See Makoto Toda & William McCarty, Corporate Governance Changes in the Two
Largest Economies: What's Happening in the U.S. and Japan?, 32 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM.
189, 190 (2005).
181. See Romano, supra note 162, at 1551.
182. See id. at 1523-26. The legal literature that attempts to find a rational explanation for
corporate scandals and legal reforms is also voluminous. See, e.g., infra note 211.
183. See Romano, supra note 162, at 1585. On the symbolic import of new crimes that
essentially criminalize behavior that is already criminal, see William J. Stuntz, The Pathological
Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505, 531-34 (2001) (arguing that, by adding crimes,
legislators make it easier for prosecutors to charge multiple crimes and obtain convictions or pleas,
and prosecutors like their discretionary power to charge crimes as they see fit). See also id. at 543-
44 (arguing that federal prosecutors often prosecute crimes, like white-collar crimes, that are more
interesting and professionally beneficial to them, and they seek laws to help them in this
prosecution); Vikramaditya Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political Economy Analysis,
82 WASH. U. L.Q. 95, 117-24 (2004) (explaining that corporate criminal liability takes away
attention from the liability of individual directors and officers).
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This psychological account also explains the similarities in the growth
of enforcement powers in the regulation of both bank and public company
management. The scandals in savings and loans in the 1980s produced
considerable public outrage over the alleged misbehavior of financial
institution directors and officers, even though the causes of the scandals
were complex and potentially inappropriately placed at management's
door."8 The outrage and the resulting focus on blaming bank executives
and directors led Congress to give bank regulators new enforcement
powers aimed at financial institution management in FIRREA (of 1989)
and FDICIA (of 1991), and, in FIRREA and the Crimes Control Act of
1990, new crimes for federal prosecutors to use.8 5 In a similar way,
corporate scandals in public firms in the late 1980s and the late 1990s
resulted in enhanced SEC enforcement powers and new federal crimes,
respectively, in the Remedies Act (of 1990) and in Sarbanes-Oxley (of
2002). 186 Amid the popular outrage about management, particularly in
complex business and financial areas, Congress is willing to grant more
administrative, even informal, enforcement powers to the regulator,
enabling it to be better able to respond rapidly to misbehavior by firm
management and to prevent additional losses, and to add more crimes to
the arsenals of federal prosecutors." 7
Yet even if the developments in both bank and SEC regulation and the
federal prosecution of management as a result of scandals resemble each
other in their psychological origins, the effects of these developments have
been very different. More enforcement powers for bank regulators and
more enumerated federal crimes add to the preexisting, all-encompassing
regulation of bank management by completing the circle of both informal
and formal oversight of bank directors and officers, from their entrance at
184. See PIERCE, supra note 18, at 75-79 (offering a concise description of the problems with
savings and loans); FDIC, AN EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980s AND EARLY
1990s, in HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES: LESSONS FOR THE FuTuRE Vol. 1, § 1 at 43 (1997), available
at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/index.html [hereinafter FDIC, HISTORY OF THE
EIGHTIES].
185. See supra notes 97-119, 125-31 and accompanying text; see also Fitzpatrick, supra note
126, at 29-31 (arguing that the new crimes in FIRREA and the CCA of 1990 were simply symbolic
action to respond to fears of ordinary Americans about threats to the banking system).
186. See Barnard, SEC Debarment, supra note 149, at 394-96 (noting that the origin of the
SEC's enforcement power in the Remedies Act came at the end of the 1980s after another decade
of financial exuberance and investor losses from financial fraud).
187. This approach also responds to the tendency of regulators, borne of their authority over
and expertise in a particular area of business or finance, to wish to conduct their regulatory mission
without interference from outsiders (including the courts). See Barnard, SEC Debarment, supra
note 149, at 405-11 (discussing the Sarbanes-Oxley extension to the SEC of the power to impose
an industry bar on public company directors and officers, observing that it was done with little
Congressional consideration and little expression of dissatisfaction with courts' imposition of the
bar).
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the bank's chartering to their exit (often at the bank's demise). By contrast,
the result for public company management is out of proportion, with a
growth of enforcement powers for the SEC and new federal crimes, but little
to balance them on the gatekeeping, standards-setting, or monitoring sides.
TV. BALANCING SEC PATERNALISM
This Part makes three arguments. First, it emphasizes that the back-
ended enforcement of SEC regulation and federal prosecution of public
company directors and officers is inappropriately one-sided, and thus
unfairly penalizes those officers. This Part also highlights the practical
factors that make it difficult, if not impossible, for the SEC to apply the
same extensive oversight of management exercised by bank regulators to
public companies. Second, this Part uses social psychology to explain the
inability of public company boards and corporate service professionals to
effectively monitor senior executives, particularly on "self-dealing." '188 It
also discusses why the model of bank regulation management involving
an outside monitor could still be effectively implemented in public firms.
Third, the Part offers a proposal that would draw from this bank regulatory
model to correct the monitoring problem in public companies and, in turn,
add balance to the SEC's current enforcement emphasis. Under the
proposal, a specified group of public firms would have an SEC examiner
monitor the corporate governance of the firm, acting as a link or mediator
between the board and senior executives on the one hand, and the SEC on
the other.
A. Equitable and Practical Problems with
SEC Regulation of Management
The comparison between the regulation of banks and the SEC's
regulation of public company management shows that SEC regulation is
inappropriately concentrated on the back end of enforcement. The
harshness of the penalties that can be placed on public firm management,
coupled with the discretionary nature of enforcement by the SEC and
federal prosecutors, is not accompanied by any close, ongoing relationship
between the directors and officers and the SEC. This disparity has both
equitable and practical consequences. The close relationship between the
bank regulator and the bank management justifies the regulator's
enforcement powers and proves beneficial to bank officers and directors.
Bank directors and officers receive approval, even conditional approval,
188. Company executives and directors are under an obligation to act in the best interests of
the corporation and not for their own interest. Self-dealing means that, when making a corporate
decision or taking a corporate action, they act for themselves. See generally 1 A.L.I., Principles of
Corporate Governance § 501, Reporter's Note 205-08 (1994).
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from regulators at chartering. They are then given extensive guidance, both
initial and ongoing, on proper conduct as regulators advise them on their
weaknesses and become familiar with their strengths through regular
interactions and examinations. Although regulators can always abuse their
discretionary enforcement powers, the exercise of these expost powers is
fair since it accompanies, and lends support to, the ex ante gatekeeping,
standard setting, and monitoring.
The SEC's discretionary approach to administrative enforcement
powers starkly contrasts with its distant and formal relationship to public
firm management that is primarily based upon a company's disclosure.
That is not to say that indirect contacts do not occur between a public
company's executives and SEC staff. For example, when a company is
going public or when it later, as a "seasoned" issuer, does an innovative
capital-raising campaign or a complicated transaction falling under the
SEC's jurisdiction, executives may respond to SEC staff concerns.
However, these responses are generally disclosure-related and dealt with
by the company's securities lawyers and legal counsel.189 The SEC and its
staff may discuss issues with, receive feedback from, and be lobbied by,
company executives during SEC rule-making, although again, this
communication is likely to be handled primarily by lawyers or bar
committees. Once it becomes public, a company's relationship with the
SEC is also mediated through the stock exchange(s) listing the company's
securities since the SEC supervises SROs like the exchanges.' 90 Yet even
the emphasis under stock exchange rules is also on the company's
disclosure, and not on the conduct of its directors and officers (unless the
conduct is disclosure-related).' 9'
These episodic contacts related to disclosure do not begin to
approximate the extensive relationship between bank management and
bank regulators. Apart from a company's disclosure, the SEC has little
opportunity to evaluate the quality of its directors and officers and to
advise them on improving their individual performance. 92 The SEC does
not send members of its staff to spend months examining or inspecting
189. See Loss & SELIGMAN,supra note 147, at 1383-84.
190. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2000) (detailing oversight of public companies).
191. Id.
192. Out of concern that the SEC was ignoring the disclosure of established public companies,
in Section 408 of Sarbanes-Oxley Congress mandated that the SEC review a company's filings at
least once every three years. See Sarbanes-Oxley § 408, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7266 (2002). The SEC had
its Division of Corporation Finance staff conduct a review of the annual reports of Fortune 500
companies and summarized their disclosure problems. See generally Summary by the Division of
Corporation Finance of Significant Issues Addressed in the Review of the Periodic Reports of the
Fortune 500 Companies, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/fortune500rep.htm (last visited May
20, 2006) (reporting on the SEC's 2002 Monitoring of Fortune 500 companies).
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public companies.'93 When a problem develops with a company, or with
a director or officer of that company, the SEC mobilizes its enforcement
powers and refers the matter to the Department of Justice, enabling
possible application of a full range of administrative sanctions.'94 An
individual director or officer's first direct contact with the SEC is thus
likely to be with the SEC's Division of Enforcement.
Although, as discussed earlier, the SEC increased its role in
gatekeeping and setting standards for management conduct in Sarbanes-
Oxley, it can go only so far in this direction. Unlike bank regulation, the
basic jurisdiction of the SEC is company disclosure, not governance. 195
Congress could change the law and extend the SEC's jurisdiction to
include this governance, but for federalist reasons it has done this only
intermittently, with most of the SEC's gatekeeping and standard-setting
being indirect because it is disclosure-based.'96 Moreover, even if it was
possible for this jurisdictional obstacle to SEC regulation of substantive
management behavior to be set aside, there would still be practical
limitations to the SEC's ability to regulate in this way. Public companies
pervade many different industries, in contrast to banks, which until
recently basically focused on deposit taking and commercial lending. The
SEC does not have staff with the competence to set detailed standards of
conduct for directors and officers in so many industries nor does it have
the resources to hire such staff (if such could even be found). 97 The SEC
concentrates its limited resources on enforcement of disclosure violations
in public companies; it cannot possibly apply a bank regulatory approach
to the regulation of public company management without an extraordinary
growth in staff resources and competence that is practically impossible and
conceptually difficult to imagine.
For the same reasons, the SEC cannot define and enforce "entrance"
criteria for public company directors and officers, other than indirectly
193. This is why the SEC requires the following legend on every prospectus filed under the
Securities Act, indicating that SEC review is not a merit review of the company: "A legend that
indicates that neither the Securities and Exchange Commission nor any state securities commission
has approved or disapproved of the securities or passed upon the accuracy or adequacy of the
disclosures in the prospectus and that any contrary representation is a criminal offense." 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.501(b)(7) (2005).
194. See generally The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml
(discussing SEC functions, including those of the Division of Enforcement).
195. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 147, at 31; see also Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462, 479-80 (1977).
196. See supra note 140.
197. Indeed, its main competence lies in setting standards of conduct for those financial
intermediaries, like broker-dealers and investment advisors and companies, over which it has
jurisdiction. See generally 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o (2002) (detailing the regulation of broker-dealers);
id. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (noting regulations for investment companies and advisors).
2006]
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through its disclosure requirements.9 8 Even if it had the jurisdiction, the
SEC staff would be hard pressed to do for public companies what bank
regulators now do in bank chartering: to evaluate whether a public
company has experienced directors and officers who are competent to
administer the firm's business plan. The number of industries of the
companies whose management suitability the SEC would have to review
would overwhelm the SEC's resources and sorely test its staff's
competence) 99 Moreover, the SEC would be put in an awkward position
if it were to screen company directors and officers at the public offering
stage, which is when its primary jurisdiction over them arises. °° Unlike an
organizing group that is seeking a bank charter, which is a business in
formation, an incipient public company is, at least historically,20' one with
a good enough track record in its business that underwriters are willing to
take the risk of selling the firm's equity securities on the public markets.
Firms going public are generally not start-up companies.20 2
Indeed, bank regulators are already experiencing the kind of practical
problems that would be faced by the SEC if it had the power to act as a
gatekeeper, and a standard setter of conduct, for public company
management. The powers of banks and banking organizations have
expanded from traditional banking to include all financial activities. 203 As
discussed earlier, in their regulation of the large, complex banking
organizations that engage in these activities, bank regulators have
acknowledged their supervisory limitations by adding a market-based and
self-regulatory approach to their traditional patemalism. 2 4 Yet the analogy
is imperfect, for at least the financial activities are in many cases
198. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
199. The SEC staff was expanded to deal with the new burdens imposed on the agency by
Sarbanes-Oxley. See Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 601, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 745, 793-94 (to
be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 78kk).
200. The SEC regulates all securities offerings. However, it has historically exempted most
private capital raising (known as private placements) from much regulatory oversight. See, e.g.,
Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-230.508 (2005). Conceivably, it could screen management at
this earlier stage. But this would make the SEC the regulator of all businesses in formation in the
United States, a problematic mandate from both a jurisprudential and practical perspective.
201. I make this qualification because, during the technology boom of the late 1990s, many
companies went public after a shorter period of existence (five years) than the historical norm
(seven years). See Jay R. Ritter & Ivo Welch, A Review oflPOActivity, Pricing, andAllocations,
57 J. FIN. 1795, 1801 (2002).
202. Id. (noting the general age of firms going public).
203. See Gram-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12, 15, 16, 18 U.S.C.).
204. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text. See generally BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL
SETTLEMENTS, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD (Apr. 2003)
(discussing the orientation of international bank regulation as capital regulation, self assessment
of risks and market discipline).
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functionally similar to traditional banking,2"5 which justified the legislation
permitting banks to engage in them in the first place. Moreover, the other
financial activities have generally been the subject of paternalistic
regulation by other agencies on which bank regulators can now
piggyback. 2
0 6
Consequently, the present SEC enforcement-oriented, regulatory
approach is unsatisfactory and may even get worse for public company
officers and directors. Despite resurgent business opposition to increased
government regulation, additional scandals will surely bring new or
enhanced SEC enforcement powers and new federal crimes aimed at
public company management. Similarly, now that federal inroads have
been made into the setting of standards of conduct for public company
directors and officers, there is reason to believe that additional standards
will be promulgated, even if disclosure-based. 2 7 But, short of a financial
cataclysm akin to the Great Depression, the psychological and political
forces necessary to persuade Congress to direct the SEC to develop an all-
encompassing paternalistic regulation of public company management will
likely not emerge.208 Public company directors and officers will
nevertheless bear the brunt of ever-increasing, and at times informal, SEC
enforcement powers with little useful ex ante SEC guidance and
monitoring.
205. Gramm-Leach-Bliley authorized a bank to be affiliated with insurance companies and
investment banks in a financial holding company, and it allowed certain large, well-capitalized
banks to set up a financial subsidiary to engage in similar, but not identical, activities (e.g., a bank
financial subsidiary could not engage in insurance underwriting). See 12 U.S.C. §§ 24a, 1843(k)
(2000). The financial activities of banks, insurance companies and investment banks are
increasingly blurring together.
206. See 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c) (specifying functional regulation in the financial holding
company). Functional regulation means that each separate financial intermediary in the holding
company is regulated by the government authority or agency most competent to do so, i.e., the SEC
regulates the investment bank affiliate, the state insurance department regulates the insurance
company, and bank regulators regulate the bank(s).
207. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 162, at 1591-94.
208. Even the cataclysm of the Depression did not result in a paternalistic regulation of U.S.
businesses, although it did with respect to banking. Given that today the ordinary American has
more of his or her assets invested in the stock market than did the ordinary American of the 1920s,
it is conceivable that a massive financial disaster could result in a changed regulation of business.
See generally STEVE FRASER, EVERY MAN A SPECULATOR 573-615 (2005) (suggesting that because
of the number of Americans investing in the stock market, a market crisis would lead to political
upheaval and possibly increased regulation).
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B. The Social Psychological Need for
Regulatory Oversight of Management
At this point, the argument could go in one of at least two possible
directions. The enforcement nature of the SEC's regulation of public
company management and the impracticality of the SEC's engaging in a
comprehensive management regulation could suggest that the SEC should
lessen its enforcement emphasis or ask Congress for new powers to
increase its monitoring of management. This Section argues, however, for
a different direction because a modified, but still limited, SEC paternalistic
regulation of management could bring a valuable service to public
companies. This regulation provides a unique kind of check on
management, particularly with respect to its self-dealing. This check was,
in fact, the primary historical reason for the regulation, especially where,
as in banks and other financial institutions, directors and officers could
easily remove a company's liquid assets. This kind of regulation would
also provide more support for directors and officers to live up to their
governance and ethical standards. As discussed below, social
psychological research, evidence from the corporate scandals, and the
experience of directors in public firms indicate that existing kinds of
regulation, such as self-regulation and the use of gatekeepers, are not as
effective as this paternalistic regulation.
Research in the field of social psychology points to the phenomenon of
(and explains the creation of) close-knit groups, in business firms as well
as in other social settings, which come to ignore their organization's
mission and function exclusively for the well-being of the group and its
members. These groups, in effect, take to a pathological extreme the
normal social behavior of human beings, chiefly their self-identification2 .9
and cohesion with their groups. While under the influence of a group
mentality and group identity,210 group members may not even see the
impropriety of their actions, if the admission would conflict with the group
consensus. The group is also likely to stifle any serious dissent within
209. For a discussion of an individual's "social" identification with a group, see Michael A.
Hogg, A Social Identity Theory of Leadership, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 184-200
(2001). Individuals also join groups to help reduce the uncertainty in their lives. See Michael A.
Hogg & Barbara A. Mullin, Joining Groups to Reduce Uncertainty: Subjective Uncertainty
Reduction and Group Identification, in SOCIAL IDENTITY AND SOCIAL COGNITION 249, 255
(Dominic Abrams & Michael A. Hogg, eds. 1999).
210. This social phenomenon is commonly referred to as "groupthink." See IRVING L. JANIS,
GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES 174-77 (2d ed. 1982)
(classic account of"groupthink"). See generally James K. Esser, Alive and Well After 25 Years: A
Review of Groupthink Research, 73 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 116
(Feb.-Mar. 1998) (summarizing empirical research on groupthink theory).
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itself. For example, it may make some dissent a formal, but meaningless,
part of group discussions. Group members may thus engage in behavior,
such as blatant self-dealing or criminal activity, that, from other
perspectives and identities within the individual personalities, they would
find completely objectionable and know to be improper.2 '
There is more than adequate evidence that dysfunctional groups with
this pathological behavior existed in the top management of public firms
involved in the corporate scandals."' As the numerous investigations,
criminal trials, and civil suits with respect to senior executives and board
members in Enron, WorldCom, Tyco International, Adelphia,
HealthSouth, and the New York Stock Exchange (to name just the most
notorious) have shown, groups formed, generally around a CEO, and took
improper advantage of their position to plunder their firms. The
misconduct of these executives and board members, in fact, exemplifies
the kind of group self-dealing and reckless mismanagement that
paternalistic bank regulation of management was designed to counter in
banks. Placed on trial or named as defendants in civil suits, but no longer
within their pathological group's identity, the participants are left to blame
one another and cannot adequately articulate the compelling power of the
group perspective that led to their ruin.213
Social psychologists point out that this pathological behavior can be
countered in several ways. A group can embrace serious self-criticism and
self-examination as part of its own self-identity.21 4 Yet this is difficult to
achieve and may be rare in reality because it requires that the group leader,
who epitomizes the identity and attributes of the group, espouse the norm
211. This acceptance of improper behavior may be gradual, as group members accept a
somewhat innocuous impropriety that leads in turn to larger improprieties. See Donald C.
Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance with the Law, 2002
COLuM. Bus. L. REV. 71, 89-90. This process refers to the socialization of individuals into
organizational evil. See John M. Darley, How Organizations Socialize Individuals into Evildoing,
in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BusNESS ETHICS 13, 13-14 (David M.
Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds. 1996).
212. See Fanto, supra note 8, at 444-60 (discussing the evidence of the group nature of the
scandals). For a symposium in which prominent social psychologists and organizational theorists
explained social behavior that led to recent corporate scandals, see Corporate Misbehavior by Elite
Decision-Makers Symposium: Perspectives from Law and Social Psychology, 70 BROOK. L. REV.
1165 (2005) (including essays by social psychologists John Darley, Michael Hogg, Tom Tyler, and
organizational scholars Rakesh Khurana and Linda Trevino).
213. For example, in the trial of former WorldCom CEO Bernie Ebbers, his guilt revolved
around a dispute about whether he or the CFO Scott Sullivan was the architect of the fraud. See
Shawn Young et al., Executives on Trial: Cooperation Pays: Sullivan Gets Five Years, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 12, 2005, at Cl.
214. See Daniel P. Forbes & Francis J. Milliken, Cognition and Corporate Governance:
Understanding Boards of Directors as Strategic Decision-Making Groups, 24 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
489,494-95 (1999).
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of self-criticism, which can threaten his or her own position." 5 Another
promising strategy to counter the overly cohesive group is to introduce
into the group a powerful outsider, who is not otherwise dependent upon
the group, and to give him or her authority over it.2"6 The outsider can
monitor the group, offer it criticism, and even lend support to the
following of ethical standards and the expression of different members'
viewpoints.
In public firms, there are really no such outsiders. As monitors,
corporate board members are supposed to offer CEOs and other senior
executives this outsider perspective, but directors, usually existing or
former CEOs or CFOs, are drawn from the same background as executives
and are bound together with them by numerous social and financial
relationships. 17 Moreover, students of board behavior, and directors
themselves, explain that it is difficult for board members, both practically
and psychologically, to resist the pressure to conform to existing board
norms, which generally favor consensus and deference to the CEO.218 As
seen by the corporate scandals, the considerable time and effort that had
been spent before Sarbanes-Oxley to improve board performance in public
companies from the inside have not really borne fruit,2"9 and limitations on
the board may prevent it from ever truly accomplishing a monitoring
role. 2 It has been similarly argued, and hoped, by many that corporate
service professionals, such as accountants, lawyers, bankers, and rating
agencies, would fulfill this outsider role and be the "gatekeepers" who
215. See JANIS,supra note 210, at 262-63.
216. See generally Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of
Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BuLL. 255, 259 (1999) (discussing how certain outsiders to whom
groups are accountable can improve certain decision-making of the groups).
217. See generally JAY W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE
REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS 17-35, 174-75, 188-89 (1989); JACKIE COOK,
CORPORATE AND DIRECTOR INTERLOCKS IN THE USA: 2003 14-17 (2003).
218. Professor Jay Lorsch points out, in an anecdotal way, the sheer power of board members
to bind each other to the group. See COLIN B. CARTER & JAY W. LORSCH, BACK TO THE DRAWING
BOARD: DESIGNING CORPORATE BOARDS FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 174 (2004).
219. See Fanto, supra note 8, at 476.
220. For a work questioning the board's limitations and the problems inherent in the
monitoring role as such, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Trouble with Boards 2 (George Wash.
Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 159, 2005), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=-801308. It may be possible to enhance boards' performance by increasing
directors' adherence to high professional and ethical standards. See generally Tom Tyler,
Promoting Employee Policy Adherence and Rule Following in Work Settings: The Value of Self-
Regulatory Approaches, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1287 (2005) (proposing a self-regulatory model that
emphasizes the role that employees' ethical values play in monitoring); Tom R. Tyler & Steven L.
Blader, Can Businesses Effectively Regulate Employee Conduct? The Antecedents of Rule
Following in Work Settings, 48 ACAD. MGT. J. 1143 (2005) (presenting evidence on the
effectiveness of internal, rather than external, motivations in employee conduct).
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would weed out bad management and bad companies from the public
markets.22" ' Indeed, new "gatekeepers" are periodically suggested by
proponents of private solutions to corporate governance.222 As the
corporate scandals showed, however, these professionals have a self-
interest and psychological need to be a group or team member, even if it
is only as a member at the periphery of the group. Accordingly, they are
generally drawn within the sphere of influence of management groups and
lose any outsider status.223 From the social psychological perspective, a
critical question in public firms becomes who can assume the outsider
status that will both check, and inspire ethical behavior by, management
groups.
C. The Public Company Monitor
It is desirable, and even necessary, to obtain the outsider and
inspirational benefits of paternalistic regulation of public company
management while at the same time balancing the enforcement emphasis
of SEC regulation and recognizing SEC limitations in this area. The
contention in this Section is that bank regulation may prove to be a model
for SEC regulation, even if it is impractical and not theoretically desirable
to expect the SEC to adopt the all-encompassing oversight of management
comparable to what bank regulators exercise with respect to bank officers
and directors. Bank regulation, in fact, provides several regulatory models.
A pertinent one for SEC regulation is that of the bank examiner who, for
large banking organizations, spends considerable time at a firm and thus
monitors bank management on an ongoing basis.2 24
From the social-psychological perspective, the examiner of a large
bank provides the valuable role of a powerful outsider to bank executives
and directors. His or her main professional social identity is created by the
regulatory agency, with its own goals and norms, to which he or she
221. For a discussion by a longtime proponent of the value of gatekeepers concerning the
failings of gatekeepers in the corporate scandals, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron:
"It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57 Bus. LAW. 1403, 1412-13 (2002) (explaining in a
perceptive way why it made sense for "gatekeepers" of our financial markets, the accountants,
investment bankers, and analysts, to go along with the scandals).
222. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, UNLEASHING A GATEKEEPER: WHY THE SEC SHOULD
MANDATE DISCLOSURE OF DETAILS CONCERNING DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABIUTY
INSURANCE POLICIES 1 (Univ. Of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. For Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 05-15,
2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract--728442 (proposing that directors' and officers'
insurance companies act as gatekeepers for public companies).
223. See, e.g., M.H. Bazerman et al., Why Good Accountants Do Bad Audits, HARv. Bus.
REv., Nov. 2002, at 96, 97. One can certainly try to give new life to these gatekeepers by imposing
upon them stricter legal responsibilities to their corporate clients, and that has been the point of
many reforms addressed to them. See Fanto, supra note 8, at 525-29.
224. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
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reports, not the institutions that he or she is regulating.225 Examiners have
no social identity need to become part of the group; it would be contrary
to their role within the agency for them to do so.226 Bank executives and
board members cannot therefore use social sanctions to isolate or dismiss
the examiner or to bring him or her into line. As outsiders with power over
banks and with a mission to ensure safe and sound banking practices,
moreover, examiners can inquire into any questionable activity, such as
any suggestion of self-dealing, and even into business decisions where
there are risks of abuse, such as executive compensation, which bank
executives and board members with their group vision cannot see as
problematic or are reluctant individually to challenge.227 Examiners affect
bank directors' and executives' thinking even when they are absent. In
their strategies and decisions, bank managers must anticipate the
examiner's viewpoint, for the managers understand that they have to
justify their actions to him or her.22 In this regulatory model, there is a
kind of regulator's "superego" within the executives' group mentality,
which may itself change their behavior. The examiner may thus embolden
those executives or board members who have reservations about particular
actions to speak up and dissent since they know that they will likely have
the support of the examiner.
This kind of regulation offers another benefit that contributes to
addressing group pathologies. The examiner reinforces high standards of
director and officer conduct and service as part of their roles within the
institution. Social psychologists and organizational theorists emphasize
that a group's ideology of acceptable goals and purposes, in short its
ethics, can significantly affect the behavior of its members.229
Unfortunately, self-interest has become enshrined as an acceptable
225. Admittedly, there is always the possibility that regulators could be captured by the
industries that they regulate. See generally FRED S. McCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING:
POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLrIcAL EXTORTION 7-19 (1997) (discussing the basics
of this capture model).
226. See AUSTIN, supra note 57, at 130-33 (discussing the distant and sometimes abrasive
demeanor of banking examiners).
227. See supra Part II.B.2. Of course, some question the effectiveness of examiners at
deterring fraud and self-interest, especially in light of the banking scandals in the 1980s and early
1990s. See MACEY ET AL., supra note 4, at 640. The regulatory failings that led to bank failures
during this period, however, did not appear to focus on problems with examiners, but on larger
regulatory issues (e.g., allowing new charters in a highly competitive environment). See FDIC,
HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES, supra note 184, at 11-13.
228. See AUSTIN, supra note 57, at 121-23 (discussing how bank directors and officers must
anticipate dealing with criticisms from bank regulators).
229. This is Professor Tyler's point, i.e., that creating internal norms (ethics and
professionalism) of positive group behavior and self-sacrifice can be much more effective (and less
costly) than outside monitoring to ensure this behavior. See Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law
Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REv. 361, 403-06 (2001).
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perspective in business (and even law) schools and in the business milieu,
and thus among directors, top executives, and the professionals who serve
them and their firms.2 3' From a social psychological perspective, the
relentless emphasis upon and celebration of the pursuit of unbridled self-
interest contributed to the scandals because it reinforced group
pathologies; groups could pursue their collective (and their members'
individual) self-interest while its members convinced themselves that they
were doing what was acceptable and even desirable. Bank regulation
presents the positions of bank director and officer as ones partaking of a
public service, given the significance of bank financing in the economic
well-being of communities, and it thus reinforces standards of conduct that
look beyond self-interest.23 The examiner demands that directors and
officers individually live up to the public service standards of their
positions and thereby reinforces their public service roles. In this regard,
he or she asks not whether the institution is supporting them, but how they
are supporting or assisting the institution.
The daunting task is to imagine how to institute a position like the bank
examiner in public firms with the theoretical and jurisprudential
limitations and practical difficulties discussed earlier. The proposal here
is a program of corporate monitors in public firms. "Monitor" rather than
"'examiner" is used since the position does not involve the constant
assessment of the firm's business operations and strategy that a traditional
bank examiner would undertake. Rather, the monitor would resemble more
the kind of bank examiner who today oversees large complex banking
organizations.232 This examiner evaluates the adequacy of a firm's control
and risk assessment systems and its supervisory and governance policies
and keeps an eye out for "red flag" transactions that raise conflict of
interest issues, particularly compensation schemes for officers and
directors.233 Business strategies and decisions would be left to the
230. See generally Sumantra Ghoshal, Bad Management Theories Are Destroying Good
Management Practices, 4 ACAD. MGT. LEARNING & EDUC. 75 (2005) (discussing the prevalence
of a self-interested approach in business schools).
231. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. Admittedly, in a financial world where self-
interest reigns, the original bank model of management behavior is under considerable pressure.
232. See supra notes 76-78; see also GAO, FINANCIAL REGULATION: INDUSTRY CHANGES
PROMPT NEED TO RECONSIDER U.S. REGULATORY STRUCTURE, GAO-05-61, at 10 (Oct. 2004),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0561 .pdf(suggesting that this regulatory model might
be used for all large financial institutions, other than banking organizations). One justification for
the monitor in a large financial institution is that the demise of the institution might jeopardize the
entire financial system, since these institutions are interconnected and the failure of one could bring
down many others (this is systemic risk). The failure of a large public firm has similar and
pernicious, if not as sudden, effects: As in the case of Enron, it undermines the confidence of
investors and ordinary people in the economic system and its fairness.
233. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 75, at 8-14.
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organization's officers and directors; the monitor is not there to stifle or
inhibit risk-taking by business executives, which is the basic purpose of
the business firm.234 A monitor, of course, could act generally as a devil's
advocate to management, questioning a strategy when it appears that it has
been adopted without any real substantive debate by board members.235
There have, in fact, been recent examples of corporate monitors. Some
firms involved in corporate scandals have had court-appointed outsiders
put in place to suggest changes to, and to monitor compliance with, their
corporate governance and internal control arrangements as a way of
addressing the behavior that brought on the scandals and of improving the
firm. Installing a monitor is, in fact, often a condition imposed by the
Department of Justice under a deferred prosecution agreement, whereby
prosecution of the firm (which could be its death sentence) is indefinitely
postponed if the firm remedies its behavior in accordance with the
agreement, with the monitor ensuring that the firm is complying with the
agreement.236 The most well-known example is Richard Breedon, a former
SEC chairman, who was appointed corporate monitor over the defunct
WorldCom (now MCI). In this post, he reviewed the problems of the firm
so as to help establish the responsibility for the scandal.237 More
importantly, he recommended the institution of policies and procedures
that were intended to prevent a recurrence of its corporate governance
problems.238 As monitor, he regularly dealt with senior executives and
board members, and was empowered to veto many firm decisions,
particularly those involving executives' compensation.239 Monitors have
234. Indeed, the presence of a monitor might help discourage lawsuits against executives and
directors for their risk-taking.
235. An outsider like the proposed monitor may face a dilemma: He or she must get inside the
organization in order to understand it adequately; but being an insider makes him or her susceptible
to the group's attraction. One can only hope that the monitor's professional and government
identity will be strong enough to resist that attraction.
236. See Steven R. Peiken, DeferredProsecution Agreements: Standardfor Corporate Probes,
231 N.Y. L.J. 52, Jan. 31, 2005; see, e.g., U.S. v. American Online, Inc., Deferred Prosecution
Agreement 6-7, Exhibit 99.2 to Form 8-K (Dec. 14, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1 105705/00011057050400005 l/f04-12_158kex993.txt.
237. For his report on WorldCom's problems, see RICHARD C. BREEDON, RESTORING TRUST:
REPORT TO THE HON. JED S. RAKOFF, THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE FUTURE OF MCI, INC. 20-24 (Aug.
2003), available at http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/rulings/02cv4963_082603.pdf.
238. See generally id (recommending "a large number of corrective steps that will strengthen
the governance practices at the Company in the future to safeguard and protect the interests of
investors, and the larger public interest in the functioning of one of the country's largest
corporations").
239. See Joann S. Lublin & Shawn Young, Even as MCI Makes Strides, Monitor Stays, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 20, 2004, at BI.
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had similar, although less-publicized, roles with other firms.24°
It is important not to wait for a scandal to appoint a corporate monitor,
for the goal of the monitor is to prevent the scandal and its costs, including
the costs associated with an all-powerful monitor like Breedon, from
occurring in the first place. The monitor envisioned here is not intended to
have extensive powers over and to intrude upon business decision-making,
as might occur when a monitor is appointed following a scandal. Yet,
despite this clarification, hard questions about the proposal remain: Should
a monitor be appointed in all public firms, or only in a subgroup of
them?24' If the former, would that not be as costly and administratively
complex as would the implementation of a bank-like examination
program? If a lesser program is adopted, which firms should have monitors
or when in a firm's life should it be required to have one? Should the
monitor be made a default requirement that firms could opt out of?.24 2
Could the task be delegated to a non-governmental organization?243 Who
would select, train and pay the monitors? What statutory changes would
the proposal entail?
The point here is to articulate and outline the proposal, not to answer
all the questions that it raises. At least with respect to the firms to which
the monitor requirement is to apply, it should be made a mandatory, not a
default, requirement. Admittedly, the kind of modified paternalistic
regulation that distinguishes itself from traditional paternalism by its use
of default (rather than mandatory) strategies has considerable appeal,
particularly in the legal academy.2" However, the problem of
240. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement-KPMG 16-18 (Aug. 26,2005), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/Press%20Releases/August%2005/KPMG%2Odp%20AGMT.pdf
(discussing appointment of monitor for a minimum three-year term, among other things, to monitor
KPMG's compliance with the agreement and its implementation of an ethics program). In addition,
as a result of the settlement with New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer and other
regulators over abuses in their use of analysts, settling investment banks each agreed to appoint an
"Independent Monitor" to review compliance with the terms of the settlement. See, e.g., In re
CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS INC., ASSURANCE OF DISCONTINUANCE PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE
LAW § 63(15) Exhibit 2 10-11 (Apr. 28, 2003).
241. Public finms number about 13,000 (as of 2003). See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMM'N, PROTECTING INVESTORS: 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 63.
242. See Romano, supra note 162, at 1595-97 (discussing benefits of opt-out default rules).
243. Cf Hildy Teegen et al., The Importance of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) in
Global Governance and Value Creation: An International Business Research Agenda, 35 J. INT'L
Bus. STUD. 463 (2004) (discussing factors that have increased the role of nongovernmental
organizations in global value creation and governance).
244. See generally Colin Camerer et al., Regulationfor Conservatives: BehavioralEconomics
and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003) (proposing a
paternalism that corrects behavioral errors but is not burdensome for people or organizations acting
rationally); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is not an Oxymoron,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003) (proposing a system of libertarian paternalism for public and private
dysfunctional groups in public firms is significant enough to require a
mandatory strategy, and firms should not be allowed to opt out of it.
Accommodation can be made to firms, however, in line with a default
approach. The appointment of a monitor could be subject to a "sunset"
provision: A firm could be free of the monitor requirement after a set
period, such as three years, unless the SEC established before a court that
the firm still needed a monitor.245 Similarly with respect to another
deregulatory or market-based suggestion, at this time the private sector,
whether by for-profit or non-profit firms, cannot satisfy the monitoring
function. In the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley, corporate governance advisory
firms have sprung up, and prominent lawyers and former regulators like
Breedon are available for, and are sometimes hired by, public firms. 246 But
there is no reason to think that these independent firms and individuals will
have the authority to break down inner group problems in public firms,
particularly at the incipient state of development of this advisory industry.
Moreover, no longer having the reinforcement of membership in a
government agency, former government officials will likely succumb in
time to the social identity of top management groups, particularly if it
comes with the typical and excessive rewards bestowed on members in
these groups. 247 This probable lack of authority of corporate governance
advisors seems especially likely when one considers that those in the long-
established professions of law, accounting, and banking, were unable to
fulfill this role, even with the support of the law and their own well-
developed ethical and professional codes.248
institutions that influences behavior while respecting freedom of choice).
245. See Romano, supra note 162, at 1600-02 (discussing various sunset strategies, although
for legislation). For example, the SEC could be required to establish before a court, by a
presentation of relevant evidence (e.g., new accounting restatements, managerial problems), that
a company should continue to have a monitor. Of course, a firm could elect to continue the monitor
on its own. Sunset provisions do counteract the bias to maintain the status quo. However, since
significant legal reforms to corporate governance are rare except in a crisis, when business
resistance can be overcome, to place a sunset provision in all legislation can undermine important
and valuable legal reforms. Without the crisis and the political opposition to them that it creates,
business interests can contend that there is no need for any real reform and proponents would have
the difficult burden, outside of a crisis, of renewing the legislation.
246. See, e.g., Joann S. Lublin & Ian MacDonald, Moving the Market: AIG Hires Levitt, Ex-
ChiefofSEC, to Advise Board, WALL ST. J., July 6,2005, at C3; see also Judith Burns, Corporate
Governance (A Special Report)-The Cop on the Board: Companies are Finding it Pays to Choose
a New Kind of Director: The Former Regulator, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2005, at R8 (pointing out
that public companies are increasingly appointing high-level regulators to sit on boards).
247. See, e.g., Jed Horowitz, Morgan Stanley Welcomes Attorney Lynch with $13.2 Million,
Dow Jones, Oct. 19, 2005 (explaining compensation package of Gary Lynch, former director of
SEC's Division of Enforcement, as chief legal officer for Morgan Stanley).
248. See Fanto, supra note 8, at 527-29. A serious question arises as to whether banking is a
profession at all. See generally Rakesh Khurana et al., Management as a Profession, in RESTORING
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58912
PATERNALISTIC REGULATIONS OF PUBLIC COMPANY MANAGEMENT
The monitor would not be required in all public firms. One possibility
is that the requirement would apply only to public firms that are the main
recipients, directly or indirectly, of ordinary investor funds in the U.S.
capital markets. These are the "well-known seasoned" public firms with
the largest market capitalization, the greatest trading volume, and the
largest offerings of their securities in the capital markets: They number
around 4,000.249 The firms are in fact replacing banks as the ultimate
recipients of most of the investment of ordinary people25 ° and, as seen in
the corporate scandals, their downfall can adversely affect many retail
investors, both directly (in investment losses) and indirectly (by making
them lose confidence in other public firms). Indeed, although these firms
are the most followed by analysts, rating agencies, and other market
professionals,25 and their stock price is deemed by financial economists
to be the most efficient, 52 they are not immune to scandals. 3 Moreover,
their size and complex operations make it difficult for board members to
feel completely competent about their understanding of the firm's
operations. They also have market power over professionals, such as
bankers, accountants, and lawyers, to whom they give considerable
business. 5 Thus, in the absence of their exercise of ethical and
professional standards, and with an excessive focus on their self-interest,
these professionals make poor monitors of such firms. 6 If the firms were
banks or financial holding companies, they would receive the special
TRUST IN AMERICAN BusiNEss (Jay W. Lorsch et al. eds. 2005) (noting that when compared to
traditional professions such as law and medicine, managerial careers could be more aptly described
as "occupations" than "bona-fide professions").
249. See Securities Offering Reform, Exchange Act Release No. 8591, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722,
44,727-29 (Aug. 3, 2005) (final rule) (noting that they represent 30% of listed issuers, but 95% of
equity market capitalization and 96% of debt; such an issuer must have either $700 million in
equity market capitalization or $1 billion in non-convertible debt).
250. See id. at 44,727.
251. See id.
252. See id. at 44,728.
253. All the companies involved in the major scandals, such as Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco
International, would have fit into this category.
254. These firms, of course, present a similar problem to a corporate monitor, but at least he
or she would not be impeded by a group-imposed blindness.
255. See PHIIPAUGAR, THE GREED MERCHANTS: How THE INVESTMENT BANKS PLAYED THE
FREE MARKET GAME 153-57 (2005) (discussing market power of largest firms).
256. This is why in Sarbanes-Oxley Congress sought to restrict the services that outside
accountants could provide to public firms whose financial statements they were auditing (i.e., to
decrease the control a firm could exercise over the auditor by threatening the auditor with a loss of
business if it did not go along with a financial presentation favored by the company). See, e.g.,
Coffee, supra note 221, at 1410-12. The way in which these firms undermine professional standards
is more subtle than what the self-interest model of behavior portrays. See generally Bazerman,
supra note 223 (arguing that professionals, almost unconsciously, cannot maintain their standards
if they become overly identified with their clients).
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supervision that regulators give to large complex banking organizations.
In addition, these firms can better bear the expenses of the monitor than
can smaller public companies. Because these firms are still numerous,
there are ways (in addition to a sunset provision) to minimize the
regulatory burden on them, say, by shrinking the number of them to which
the requirement applies: For example, the monitor may be imposed upon
a firm only if there occurs a triggering event (e.g., an accounting
restatement) or, on an initial basis, only upon public firms that have a clear
public interest, such as healthcare organizations.
The proposal would be for the SEC to hire public company monitors.
The SEC would be as inclusive as possible in the hiring while recognizing
that the position demands a business, financial, and legal background. A
monitor would be a regular SEC staff member who has no conflicts in
taking the position, nor could he or she work for a monitored firm or a
related party for a cooling off period following his or her departure from
the SEC. These requirements will eliminate from the pool the kinds of
people now selected for corporate boards, such as current and former
CEOs and CFOs, high-level bankers and lawyers, leaders of nonprofits,
and even former government officials, like SEC commissioners. There are
without doubt numerous qualified persons both within the SEC and
without, who do not have the strategic connections and prestige to be
board members, but who do have the requisite business and legal
competence. Moreover, since he or she would be in a full-time position,
the monitor would be expected to be more active than a typical board
member in acquiring and checking information about a company. The SEC
would determine monitor compensation, in accordance with guidelines
that it would establish, which would be paid from a general assessment on
companies subject to the monitor requirement.257
The SEC would train and supervise monitors. A corporate monitor
would need to understand the general business and governance issues of
the industry and firms that he or she is monitoring and to know how to
recognize the red flags of self-dealing and mismanagement in that industry
and its firms. In fact, it might make sense for a monitor to be assigned to
supervise a number of firms in a specific industry and to be associated
with and further instructed by the group within the SEC's Division of
257. There are subtle costs or benefit issues lurking here. A system of corporate monitors
could give investors more confidence about investing in public firms than they should have: An
investment in a public firm is not free of risk or of low risk, like a bank deposit. This confidence,
in turn, may lead investors to demand less of a return than they otherwise would, which would give
an implicit subsidy to firms with a monitor (i.e., investors, thinking of firms as being backed by the
government, would impose less of a discount than is appropriate on them). It is important for the
SEC to continue to communicate that the government is not standing behind public firms, including
those with a monitor.
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Corporation Finance that reviews disclosure of firms in that industry.258
This assignment and association would help both parties. The monitor
would benefit from the developed expertise of the Division's group as to
issues in the firm's industry and the firm itself-e.g., the staff would warn
the monitor to be on the lookout for specific problems. The Division's
staff, in turn, would gain an inside, on-the-ground perspective from the
monitor that could help it critically review disclosure of other companies
in the firm's industry, particularly new public companies. The monitor
would give the SEC the kind of access to and close knowledge about
companies and their management. Moreover, associating a monitor with
a group within the SEC will help the monitor assimilate SEC values and
loyalty, which will be necessary to give the monitor the social identity that
will enable him or her to counter the social attractions of the groups in the
firms that he or she is monitoring.
The use of monitors would also balance the current enforcement
orientation of the SEC's paternalistic regulation of public company
management by introducing an ongoing relationship with public company
management that would make the exercise of its enforcement powers (and
prosecution by U.S. Attorneys) justifiable and equitable.259 A monitor can
engage in a constant dialogue with management of the public firm and
alert officers and directors at an early stage to problematic transactions and
SEC concerns. The monitor would also relay to the SEC staff information
about a firm's practices, its management, and its management's views
about critical disclosure issues. Accordingly, many management problems
would be avoided altogether with this relationship, because they would be
resolved informally and early, without the need for the heavy hand of
enforcement. If, moreover, the SEC feels that a situation calls for use of
its enforcement powers, this exercise will be justifiable for, except in
extreme circumstances, it would come after informal accommodation and
258. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, How the SEC PROTECTS INVESTORS,
MAINTAINS MARKET INTEGRITY, AND FACILITATES CAPITAL FORMATION, http://www.sec.gov/
about/whatwedo.shtml#org (last visited May 21, 2006) (containing a discussion regarding the
activities of the Division); see also JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES
REGULATION 202 (9th ed. 2003) (containing an excerpt from William W. Barker, SECRegistration
of Public Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933, 52 BuS. LAw. 65 (1996) (discussing the
splitting of the Division of Corporation Finance into subgroups based on industry)). Firms might
be concerned that a monitor would pass along information to competitors in their industry,
especially if, as is likely, the monitor also supervises some of these other firms. Yet a similar
confidentiality issue exists for bank examiners without any reported problems. In fact, a monitor's
involvement in numerous firms in the same industry may help raise industry standards when the
monitor points out problems and possible solutions based on his or her experience in monitoring
the industry. See AUSTIN, supra note 57, at 132-33 (recommending that bank directors and officers
take advantage of examiners' industry expertise).
259. See supra Part IV.A.
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prior warnings have failed. Given these advantages of monitoring, it is
possible that public firms not required to have a monitor might opt into the
regulation.26°
Implementation of even a limited corporate monitor program upon
public companies would require a legislative change, for the federal
securities laws, being primarily disclosure-based, despite the substantive
corporate governance nature of much of Sarbanes-Oxley, are not
expansive enough to allow for this reform. 261 The stock exchanges could
impose this monitoring system, but they would also likely be reluctant to
do so without a legislative mandate. This in turn raises the question of
political will. Sarbanes-Oxley was a significant reform following the
revelation of massive corporate scandals. Now there is an ongoing,
forceful backlash against many of its reforms from the business
community, its spokespersons in law firms and bar associations, and from
sympathetic, generally conservative legal academics.262 In the absence of
new scandals, politicians will likely not have the will to impose any
additional regulatory burden upon even a limited class of public
companies.
That this proposal, in any of its possible modifications, will not be
implemented in the foreseeable future does not justify declining to make
it, or not taking it seriously, especially if the proposal responds to
continuing problems in public firm management. During this period of
backlash, it is critical that reform proposals be put forward, debated, and
kept alive if they have any value, for there will eventually be a need for
them. The corporate scandals showed that, despite years of corporate
governance reforms in the law and in best practices, many public firms
were operated primarily for the benefit of small groups of executives,
board members, and outside professionals. This long-standing problem in
firms ebbs and flows, but never goes away.263 Sarbanes-Oxley likely
260. Thus, the ideal design of the monitoring system may be to require a monitor for certain
firms (subject to any sunset provisions) and to allow all public firms to opt into it.
261. It may be possible for the SEC to implement the monitoring system on the basis of its
jurisdiction over public firms and its mission of ensuring the accuracy of disclosure to public firm
investors. But it is questionable whether this implementation could withstand a challenge to its
jurisdiction. Requiring public company boards to have public directors would interfere with state
corporate law's regulation of corporate governance. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462, 479 (1977) (observing that the internal governance of companies is a traditional province of
state corporate law); Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407-08 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (striking
down SEC regulation attempting to enforce one share/one vote as a stock exchange listing rule).
262. See supra note 12.
263. See generallyErnie Englander & Allen Kaufman, Managerial FiduciaryDuty andSocial
Responsibility: The Changing Nature of Corporate Governance in Post- War America 2 (Dep't of
Strategic Mgmt. & Pub. Polic, George Wash. Univ. Sch. of Bus. & Pub. Mgmt., SMPP Working
Paper No. 03-04, 2003), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=472965 (describing the cyclical
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improves public firm governance and checks extreme governance
problems, especially when, in the immediate wake of the scandals, board
members and gatekeeping professionals become energized and vigilant. In
time, however, the group mentality of executives and boards will reassert
itself-a mentality reinforced by the fact that the circle from which these
individuals are drawn is a closed one-because no reform has adequately
addressed group pathologies in corporate management.264 And there will
be serious scandals again. At that time, during the short window that
politics allows for reform, it will be necessary to have ready reform
proposals that have survived a critical debate, and the corporate monitor
may be one of these.265 The business community may even find that it is
in its interest not to oppose the corporate monitor, if it only recognizes that
the regulation of public firm management is already a long way down the
paternalistic road, but, at least with regards to enforcement, in a way that
is not favorable to this management. Executives and board members are
now sanctioned harshly for their faults by the SEC and federal prosecutors
without having the kind of relationship with a regulator that might make
unnecessary the sting of enforcement.
V. CONCLUSION
The comparison of bank regulation of bank management with SEC
regulation of public company management offers a new perspective on the
latter. This kind of bank regulation is all encompassing: Bank regulators
screen bank executives and directors, establish standards of conduct for
them and then monitor their compliance with the standards, and enforce
them through informal and formal proceedings. By contrast, SEC
regulation of management has been for many years primarily disclosure-
based. As a result of recurring corporate scandals, it has grown during the
last decades in ways often borrowed from bank regulation. The outcome
nature of corporate ethics).
264. See Fanto, supra note 8, at 524-37.
265. Another reform, which also has a bank regulatory origin, would be to have a public firm
compliance officer who reviews transactions and business relationships for compliance with
regulatory guidelines. This officer (with a supporting staff) is common in banks, given the web of
regulations that surround them. See McCoY, supra note 23, at § 14.04[3][c][v][c][4]. Because of
the growth of regulations affecting the public firm, particularly with respect to disclosure and
internal controls, there is increasing need in these firms for this kind of officer to oversee the firm's
compliance with the enhanced regulatory requirements. See, e.g., Joseph Weber, The New Ethics
Enforcers, Bus. WK., Feb. 13, 2006, at 76 (discussing the role of compliance officers in public
firms). Yet it is unlikely that the officer can alone provide the necessary social psychological
counterweight to management, again for both individual and social reasons: Ultimately, he or she
becomes part of the firm's hierarchy and has little real authority unless supported by a government
outsider.
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in SEC regulation, however, is an unsatisfactory imbalance, with the SEC
doing little screening of public firm officers and directors, setting only
general standards for their conduct and having no ongoing relationship
with them, and then (together with the Department of Justice's criminal
prosecutions) using bank-like enforcement penalties that include a lifetime
bar of an officer or director from public company positions.
Not only is this outcome unfair to public company officers and
directors, but it does not produce the best corporate governance outcome.
One advantage of the close relationship between bank regulators and bank
management is that bank directors and officers receive the advice and
oversight of a genuine outsider in the person of a bank examiner. This
outsider is well-positioned to resist the inevitable social pressures of
management groups and can even help bank executives, board members,
and advisors themselves break out of pathological group perspectives. As
an outsider with authority, an examiner may help the management group
avoid improper self-interested transactions and cases of gross
mismanagement. This examiner, moreover, cannot be replicated by any
other party in corporate governance, because, as corporate scandals have
shown, others, such as corporate service professionals, can be co-opted
into firm management groups.
The proposal set forth in this Article is not to transform SEC regulation
of public firm management into the all-encompassing paternalistic
oversight of bank regulators. The diversity of public firms and the
governmental resources that would be required for this oversight make it
both theoretically daunting and impracticable. Rather, the proposal is to
require only certain public firms, perhaps with the largest capitalization
and trading volume, to have a corporate monitor akin to that used in large
complex banking organizations. This means that the monitor ensures that
the firm has adequate control systems and follows proper standards of
management conduct, and, as a general firm devil's advocate, he or she
would scrutinize self-interested transactions and question a firm's overall
strategy and business plans, with a goal of preventing gross
mismanagement and self-dealing. The monitor would be a member of the
SEC staff and work closely with the SEC's Division of Corporation
Finance, which would also be able to improve company disclosure as a
result of the "on the ground" insights of the monitors.
The proposal will not be popular in this period of backlash against
corporate governance reforms. However, it may become politically more
palatable if public firm officers and directors realize that today they
personally are bearing most of the costs and receiving none of the benefits
of the SEC's existing paternalistic regulation. Legislation has given the
SEC and the Department of Justice considerable enforcement powers over
public firm management. Other scandals will surely enhance these powers
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and add other punitive measures to the SEC's and federal prosecutors'
arsenals. Company executives and directors may in time come to realize
that they will be the beneficiaries of a proposal that could make infrequent
the exercise of these powers by establishing a relationship between firm
management and the SEC that can alert firm officers and directors to SEC
concerns.

